Anglo-Spanish Trade and Diplomacy 1712-1742 by La Jeunesse, Forrest
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anglo-Spanish Trade and Diplomacy 1712-1742 
 
Forrest La Jeunesse 
 
Liberty University 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Carey Roberts 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
Chapter One .................................................................................................................................. 4	
Treaty of Madrid 1667 & Godolphin Treaty 1670 ................................................................ 7	
The Emergence of the British Empire as a Commercial Power in the Early 18th Century 9	
State of Spanish Empire at the Start of the 18th Century ................................................... 13	
First British Empire ................................................................................................................ 16	
Imperial School ....................................................................................................................... 17	
Anglo-Centric .......................................................................................................................... 19	
Research Focus ........................................................................................................................ 21	
Chapter 2 ..................................................................................................................................... 24	
Treaty of Madrid 1667 & 1670, the Foundation of Anglo-Spanish Trade Treaties, and 
Negotiations in the 18th Century ............................................................................................ 28	
The Path to Utrecht ................................................................................................................ 34	
Britain’s Push to Negotiate for Peace .................................................................................... 37	
Concessions Sought from Spain ............................................................................................. 44	
The South Sea Company ........................................................................................................ 47	
Spanish Governance and Diplomacy After Utrecht ............................................................ 50	
Britain’s Governance and Diplomacy After Utrecht ........................................................... 55	
The War of the Quadruple Alliance ...................................................................................... 59	
Treaty of the Hague, February 1720 ..................................................................................... 64	
Chapter 3 ..................................................................................................................................... 68	
The Treaty of Vienna .............................................................................................................. 70	
Alliance of Hanover ................................................................................................................ 72	
The Push Towards War ......................................................................................................... 75	
Anglo-Spanish War- 1727-1729 ............................................................................................. 79	
Treaty of Seville ....................................................................................................................... 81	
Chapter 4 ..................................................................................................................................... 85	
A Shift in British Diplomacy & Continued Grievances ...................................................... 86	
The Loss of Patino ................................................................................................................... 92	
The Demand for Retribution Against Spanish Depredations ............................................. 93	
Convention of Pardo ............................................................................................................... 98	
The South Seas Role in the Causation of the War of Jenkins Ear ................................... 100	
Economic Impact of Illicit British/ French/ Dutch Trade on Spanish Merchants .......... 102	
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 104	
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 108	
2 
 
 
Illicit trade by British merchants throughout the 17th and 18th century was common in the 
Spanish Indies, and it proved quite profitable. British merchants, traders, and governmental 
officials longed to access the riches of the Spanish Indies, but had constantly been blunted 
diplomatically by the Spanish Empire. In 1731, the Spanish guarda costa, in an effort to stop the 
growing illegal trade, had became highly aggressive in the Caribbean at stopping British 
smugglers and legitimate merchants alike and either confiscated their cargo or removed body 
parts from the captains of smuggling vessels. However, the British merchants and smugglers 
often viewed the risk of meeting with Spanish depredations as a small price to pay for such large 
profits a kind of tax on the immensely profitable smuggling trade.1  
Why were the British merchants willfully disregarding Spanish trade protections and 
sovereignty? Did Spain purposefully and willfully deny access to British merchants through 
traditional diplomatic means? Were the Spanish able to meet the manufactured good needs of its 
colonies? Lastly, why were the British so focused on accessing the Spanish West Indies trade 
when there seemed to be pressing power balance issues in continental Europe? Whichever of 
these issues were of most importance to these two countries mattered little to Captain Robert 
Jenkins in 1731. Thus, on April 9th, 1731 Captain Robert Jenkins was stopped by one of the 
guarda costa vessels and his ship The Rebecca was aggressively ransacked and searched for 
contraband. Finding none, the guarda costa members proceeded to steal all that they could find 
of value aboard the ship. Unsatisfied that they had not found valuable or contraband goods, they 
hoisted Captain Jenkins up the mast by his neck hoping that the fear of death would lead to either 
                                               
1 Young, Patricia T., and Jack S. Levy. "Domestic Politics and the Escalation of Commercial Rivalry: Explaining the 
War of Jenkins’ Ear, 1739–48." European Journal of International Relations17, no. 2 (2010) 217. 
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the smuggled goods or more valuables. When Jenkins had nothing to offer, the Spanish Captain 
of the guarda costa, Juan de Leon Fandino lopped off Jenkins’ ear with his cutlass. Captain 
Fandino gave Jenkins his ear and told him, “Carry it to your king and tell his majesty that if he 
were present I would serve him in the same matter.”2  
In 1738, Captain Jenkins, with his withered ear preserved in a bottle, stood before 
members in the British House of Parliament and recounted his harrowing tale about the atrocities 
committed against his person by the Spanish guarda costa. This incident was the spark that 
forced Robert Walpole, the First Lord of the Treasury (1721-1742), into a war he had no desire 
to fight, but a war that commercial interests and powerful merchants had pushed for.3 The British 
throughout the 18th-century had fought Spain to allow for greater access to its Spanish Indies 
colonies, and by diplomacy or by force, the British were not giving up on that goal. It is 
important to note that the War of Jenkin’s Ear “was, perhaps, the first of English wars in which 
the trade interest absolutely predominated, in which the war was waged solely for balance of 
trade rather than for balance of power.”4 For at this time, the British were pushing to expand, and 
expand they did into what is known as the First British Empire.   
 
 
 
                                               
2 Lanning, John Tate. Diplomatic History of Georgia: A Study of the Epoch of Jenkins Ear. Pembroke, NC: 
University Of North Carolina at Pembroke, 2012, 176. 
3 Sir Robert Walpole is considered the first Prime Minster of Great Britain. However, he himself never used the term 
Prime Minister during his tenure. It is widely recognized by historians that the formal position was established in 
1721. For ease of reading, Sir Robert Walpole will be referred, to at times, as the British Prime Minister in this 
thesis.    
4 Temperley, Harold W. V. "The Causes of the War of Jenkins Ear, 1739." Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society (1909) 197. 
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Chapter One 
 
Between the War of Spanish succession till the war of Austrian succession, the British 
focus shifted from matters of the European Continent towards that of expanding its trade and its 
commercial empire. With the securing of an important treaty with France, the British were able 
to seek trading concessions from the Spanish, through diplomacy or war, in order to gain 
economic dominance in the West Indies. However, unequal and often conflicting interests 
between the two nations prevented desired expansion into the West Indies for the British, so they 
sought to exploit vague treaty terms and obligations in order to conduct a vast illegal trading 
scheme in the West Indies that only drew the two counties closer to war than that of a negotiated 
trade and peaceful partnership.  
Modern study and interpretations of the first British Empire tend to fall into three areas of 
academic thought and research. Currently, in early 21st-century historical research, the main 
focus of American academia is on the Atlantic historical viewpoint. Modern studies are designed 
to give voice to a variety of cultures, peoples, and ideas. It is often presented as a way to change 
the focus of the traditional nation-state history, and instead focus on peoples that were either 
subjugated or oppressed by colonial and imperialistic empires. The second view is that from a 
distinctly British historical perspective. The focus of the British historical aspect is the expansion 
of the Empire in the West Indies and the interplay of economically competing Empires in 
Europe. One could say it is Eurocentric in its approach with the West Indies and America as 
merely a backdrop of European commercial interests. Lastly, there is the American study and 
scholarship on the First British Empire. More empirical and traditional than the other two 
approaches the main focus here falls into the study of the rise of the thirteen colonies and their 
rebellion which lead to the conclusion of the First British Empire. While all of these studies 
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contribute to the historical research of the First British Empire, each tends to pay scant attention 
to the role nuanced role and seemingly ineffective of diplomacy in effect on trade in the First 
British Empire.   
With the divided nature of research, focus, and interpretations, a researcher can get lost in 
the maze of competing ideas and views. Therefore, it is critical to find a balance and use research 
to construct a narrative that does not exclude vital information because of the varied scholarship. 
While the study of the role of the thirteen colonies played in the eventual downfall of First 
British Empire, their purpose is more secondary in the constant conflicts over trade and territory 
by the rival Anglo-Spanish Empires. The study of European diplomacy is fraught with 
complexity and change. Rivals become friends, and friends become rivals.  
Therefore, it is essential for a researcher to narrow the focus upon two diplomatic states 
when discussing diplomacy and commercial rivalry. The research is made easier by the fact that 
Spain had an established Empire in the West Indies, and the British were attempting to infiltrate 
that Empire through the acquisition of land and trade. The French had only moderately 
established themselves in the West Indies. Their territorial holdings in the Americas were vast, 
yet lacked the population and resources to effectively hold them. Thus, they were only moderate 
competitors economically in the colonial world. The Dutch were an immensely wealthy and 
powerful trading nation; however, they were no longer attempting to colonize the West Indies to 
any large extent. They wished trade in it because they had been forced out of much of their North 
American holdings by the British when the 18th Century had commenced.  
There were difficulties in Anglo-Spanish diplomacy in the era of the First British Empire. 
There were elements in Britain, mostly merchants and business leaders who were desirous to 
gain access to the wealthy Spanish New World. The Spanish Empire was attempting a 
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resurgence and sought to protect its economic holdings. The Spanish were going through a 
change in their monarchy that introduced King Philip the V (1700-1746), a French prince, to rule 
over Spain. This foreign prince and now king created contention and fear in Europe and forged 
an alliance that wished to prevent a merging of the Franco-Spanish Empires and a French 
superstate. King Philip the V of Spain also oversaw radical changes in the Spanish government. 
During this time there was the rise of professional statesmen and ministers who were auxiliaries 
of an absolute monarchy. These new ministers had greater power to act than any of the previous 
governmental statesmen.5 This study understands that it is essential to focus on men who were in 
power of the respective nation-states. For each of these nations had powerful interest groups 
made up of diplomats, negotiators, business, politicians, and the public. Some of these 
individuals had significant influence upon their respective monarchs and governments.  
British commercial interests were heavily embedded in British politics in the early 18th 
century giving them an oversized prominence when it came to policy making and diplomatic 
pressures. While there were those in the government who were focused on maintaining the 
balance of power on the European continent, there was also a desire to pay off sovereign debt 
and improve global reach of British trade to drive the economy. There were several powerful and 
government-backed trading companies, such as the South Seas Company, which controlled trade 
and large amounts of sovereign debt. Many ministers of parliament had direct financial interests 
in those companies as either investors or as board members. In the early 18th century trade, not 
simply direct warfare or territorial consolidation, became a major cornerstone in British 
expansionist policy. The question was, what would be the best way to implement and expand 
                                               
5 Hargreaves-Mawdsley, W. N. Eighteenth-century Spain, 1700-1788: A Political, Diplomatic and Institutional 
History. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979. 2. 
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trade? British Whigs, led by Robert Walpole and Henry Pelham, advocated for a pro-maritime 
war position in which Britain would try to conquer territory they wanted to trade in or sought 
treaty-based, after-war concessions from Spain to access desired trading markets. Tories, such as 
the Duke of Marlborough and Lord Godolphin, often attempted to gain access to the New World 
markets through diplomatic treaties, thus trying to prevent war and sovereign debt. Both policies 
during the span of 1712 to 1742 were attempted with varying results.  
This research offers a view on diplomatic efforts by the British to expand and grow their 
access to the Spanish New World. There were a number of direct diplomatic trading issues that 
were at the heart of the dispute between the two nations. To better understand the national 
viewpoints, this research will be one with a Eurocentric view, emphasizing the diplomatic role 
and the pressure from commercial sources placed upon the government. Adopting this view 
helps to frame arguments and disputes that had created a litany of trade concerns ranging from 
accessing specific ports, what goods would be allowed in, and how often trade would be allowed. 
To give deeper insight, it is essential to discuss and learn about the men involved in governance, 
the commercial and economic interests that affected negotiations, and the underlying economic 
concerns by both nations.  
Treaty of Madrid 1667 & Godolphin Treaty 1670 
The Anglo-Spanish War did not yield the more considerable territorial rights Britain 
sought to gain from Spain.6 It did, however, produce the Treaty of Madrid and the equally 
beneficial Godolphin Treaty. The Treaty of Madrid set out to finally establish trading rights and 
                                               
6 The Anglo-Spanish War in question was from 1654-1660. Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell was pushing a strategic 
idea of Western Design. While the war did lead to colonial gains for the English, it was more of a war deigned to 
deprive the Spanish of much needed colonial resources and bullion. The British managed to secure Jamaica during 
the war and used it as an important trading center dealing in slaves and contraband shipped to Spanish colonies.  
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privileges between the British and Spanish Empires. It is considered to be the basis on which all 
subsequent trade treaties were concluded over the next thirty years between the two competing 
powers.7 One of the key components was the formal recognition of the British territorial rights in 
the Caribbean and the legitimacy of British established American colonies. The treaty allowed 
for freedom of movement of British ships and commerce in the Caribbean.  
This treaty benefited British shipping and merchant interests as it commercially laid the 
foundations of a robust trade by re-opening trade in the dominions of the two Crowns and 
granted English merchants such privileges as were enjoyed by native Spanish traders.8 Some of 
these privileges reduced or eliminated duties and fees on some products and goods, offered 
protection from embargos, and granted safe passage into ports. On the whole, the duties 
established under the treaty of I667 were very advantageous to England.9 While the Treaty of 
Madrid and the expanded treaty with expanded articles by the same name sought to address all of 
the contending issues between the two Empires in the New World, it often fell short of its ideas. 
Britain and Spain often interpreted the vague portions of the treaties to their benefit, much to the 
protest of the other party. Much of these issues laid unresolved until the Treaty of Utrecht, in 
which much of the vagueness had been clarified.   
However, the treaty did not grant the British any trading rights within Spanish colonies in 
the New World, and access to the West Indies was one of the key measures that British 
merchants and government had sought. The British, lacking formal access, and now with 
footholds in the Caribbean, commenced a vast illicit trade and smuggling operations. While the 
                                               
7 McLachlan, Jean. "Documents Illustrating Anglo-Spanish Trade between the Commercial Treaty of 1667 and the 
Commercial Treaty and the Asiento Contract of 1713." Cambridge Historical Journal 4, no. 3 (1934) 299. 
8 Ibid, 304.  
9 Ibid, 306.  
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British made large profits on illegal trading in the Spanish Empire, these activities created 
tension and disputes between the two Empires and drove them closer to war.  
The Emergence of the British Empire as a Commercial Power in the Early 18th Century 
Mercantilist economics were at the forefront of British national policy since the mid-17th 
century.  Mercantilism was the prevailing economic dogma within the empire. The idea of 
mercantilism10 assumed that a limit existed to global trade and that a nation’s wealth was 
measured in terms of self-sufficiency.11 Throughout the 17th century, the emerging British 
Empire sought to reduce its dependence upon European markets for raw materials and products 
to assume a position of self-sufficiency. To achieve this, they moved to secure lands and access 
Spanish trade ports in the New World.  
It had been understood that refining raw produce that was grown in the overseas colonies 
would increase employment (in Britain) and provide a valuable export to profit both merchants 
and shipping.12 The thought process behind this was that if the empire were economically 
independent of needing foreign supplies and manufactured goods, it would ensure greater 
national and economic security. No longer requiring foreign importation or reliance upon those 
exports would allow for Britain to become a trading and exporting nation that produced its own 
manufactured goods. Working towards economic self-sufficiency as a nation would create a 
surplus of funds in the national treasuries. Those funds, in turn, could be used to protect those 
new financial investments through military and naval power. 
                                               
10 The mercantile system was designed to protect and grant specialized privileges to both merchants and those who 
produced goods and other manufactured products. The protections were put into place and defended by officials 
under the guise of national safety and security interests.    
11 James, Lawrence. The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. New York, NY: St. Martins Pr., 1996. 28. 
12 Darwin, John. Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2013. 
20-21.  
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Commercial wealth and naval power were seen as self-sustaining. Flourishing trade 
fueled the navy through customs duties and trained seafaring manpower. An expanding and 
growing merchant marine created a large pool of well-trained merchant seamen to call upon 
when the Royal Navy needed to be expanded in time of war.13 A stronger, well trained Navy in 
return protected commercial trade routes and opened up needed avenues to access new trading 
ports.14 More so, the argument was made that there was no point in engaging in empire building 
unless it increased British trade. After all, a profitless empire was a contradiction in terms.15 
Money was power in Europe, especially hard bullion currency. It allowed for the raising 
of armies, the funding of fleets, and the ability to project power. Without secure and economic 
growth through trade and export, taxation on goods, services, and property would have to be 
used, which threatened political and domestic stability for a government. There was a general 
agreement in Britain that plenty and power were closely related. The relation was that trade 
created wealth, wealth produced power, power was the guardian, and therefore should be the 
promoter of trade.16 In 1711, a pamphlet was published in Britain by Daniel Defoe (1660-1731) a 
prolific and well-known Tory publisher who often sought to influence British policy with his 
writings.17 Defoe’s pamphlet was meant to persuade members of Parliament that trade had 
become absolutely necessary to all the people of Europe as it allowed for their defense against 
ambitious encroachments of one neighboring kingdom or state against another.18  Therefore, it 
                                               
13 Sheehan, Michael. "The Sincerity of the British Commitment to the Maintenance of the Balance of Power 1714–
1763." Diplomacy & Statecraft 15, no. 3 (2004). 493. 
14 Brewer, John. The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688-1783. New York, NY: Knopf, 1989. 
168. 
15 Ibid, 150. 
16 Darwin, J. Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain, 150. 
17 Daniel Defoe is best known for writing Robinson Crusoe. However, his political writings were also highly 
influenceable in Britain.   
18 A Letter to a Member of Parliament, on the Settling a Trade to the South-sea of America. London: Printed for J. 
Phillips, and Are to Be Sold by A. Baldwin in Warwick-Lane, 1981. 
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became apparent to those in leadership positions in the growing empire, that the new 
transatlantic commerce they were generating was a vital national asset to be coveted, protected 
and extended by all means, including by the threat or use of military aggression.19 
The British Empire and its merchants were not solely content with obtaining colonies and 
access to raw materials. Instead, they sought to gain access to the other European empires 
overseas colonies, mainly those of Spain. Throughout the 16th and 17th century, Britain, France, 
and the Dutch had engaged in privateering raids on Spanish America and its treasure ships. 
While profitable at times, Britain in the late 17th and early 18th century was seeking to secure 
legal trade with Spain, as it found that direct trade in Spanish America was regarded as more 
efficient means of extracting wealth from their empire.20 British merchants and the government 
also knew that customs returns often dropped in times of war because of the enemy’s disruption 
of English trade.21 Noted again in the 1711 pamphlet, gold and silver were not found in 
abundance in Europe and had to be “procurable by foreign trade.” That trade was most beneficial 
within the Spanish Empire as the “sloth and ineptness of their manufacturers”22 had left open the 
need for highly manufactured goods produced in Britain.  
Researchers and scholars have recently made sure to note that Englishmen, in the 17th 
century, had long traded directly with Spain.23 Lack of access to European Spanish trade was not 
a pressing issue with the British. Doctor Vera Lee Brown noted that the reason Spanish trade was 
                                               
19 James, L. The Rise and Fall of the British Empire, 28. 
20 Satsuma, Shinsuke. Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century. Silver, Seapower and the 
Atlantic. Woodbridge, CT: Boydell & Brewer, 2014. 34. 
21 Brewer, J. The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688-1783, 99. 
22 A Letter to a Member of Parliament, on the Settling a Trade to the South-sea of America 
23 Finucane, Arian. The Temptations of Trade: Britain, Spain, and the Struggle for Empire. Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016. 2.  
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(so highly) prized was for the bullion that it brought to England.24 This was because the British 
colonies did not produce any significant amounts of gold and silver. Spain, however, had access 
to vast amounts of gold and silver bullion from its New World colonies in Mexico and Peru. As 
Doctor Brown further explains, it was through Spain that England tapped into the world’s supply 
of gold and silver. And without that access, England would be hard pressed to be able to 
continue engaging in commerce in the Far East.25 
The British wanted greater access to the Spanish New World, but Spain jealously guarded 
this access. Access meant the British merchants would gain the ability to deal with the colonies 
that produced gold and silver directly. This would allow the traders to set rates of exchange and 
valuation. The markets in the New World were also highly diverse and offered alternative 
trading options, not just bullion. It was known that Spanish manufacturing was not capable of 
producing the needed products that were required by the colonists in their empire. To meet the 
colonial needs, Spain bought manufactured goods and products from a variety of European 
sources, and then shipped and sold them in their New World holdings. The Spanish were not 
open to allowing the British direct and unlimited access to the wealth of their Empire, as it would 
hurt Spanish merchants and traders.  
Britain entering into the 18th century as an emerging economic power had limited 
remedies when seeking Spanish concessions into its New World holdings. Either Britain would 
gain access through peaceful trade negotiations or face pressure from the growing commercial 
class. By and large, commercial and colonial lobbies in the British Empire endorsed aggressive, 
acquisitive anti-Spanish policies. These influential groups sought annexations that offered them 
                                               
24 Lodge, Richard. "Presidential Address: Sir Benjamin Keene, K.B.: A Study in Anglo-Spanish Relations in the 
Earlier Part of the Eighteenth Century." Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 15 (1932). 2. 
25 Ibid, 2.  
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fresh opportunities for trade and investment.26 If Spain was not willing to peacefully open up its 
New World holdings, then the merchants, traders, and investors who held power and influence in 
the British government at the start of the 18th century were willing to go to war to become more 
prosperous and assert British mastery of the seas.  
State of Spanish Empire at the Start of the 18th Century 
 From the late 15th century to the mid-17th century, the Spanish Empire was one of the 
most significant and wealthiest empires of the Era. With extensive New World holdings that 
produced vast quantities of gold and silver bullion, the Spanish Empire was an economic force 
that countries greatly desired access to. Despite successful conquests and the creation of a vast 
empire, Spain did not draw the same benefits as their rivals did from imperial expansion.27 While 
wealthy, the Spanish failed to invest in building up its industrial capacity and production 
infrastructure at home that would generate wealth. Instead, the Spanish bought and traded with 
its European neighbors and Asian suppliers who were producing the goods and products that 
both the Spanish and their colonies wanted and needed. The capital expended by Spain to 
competing countries enriched and encouraged its neighbors to seek additional commercial 
access.  
It is important to emphasize the non-extractive nature of the Spanish imperial economic 
system, in that the vast majority of American revenue was spent in the colonies.28 This further 
incentivized European traders to gain access to Spanish America, as that was where the money 
and wealth were centered. Colonial holdings were expensive to maintain, as they required vast 
                                               
26 James, L. The Rise and Fall of the British Empire, 53. 
27 Eastman, Scott. "The Spanish Empire and Atlantic World History." Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 
15, no. 2 (2014). 1.  
28 Ibid, 4. 
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expenditures of treasure to run mines, hacienda plantations, and security and military forces to 
put down rebellions and keep their colonial the populations at peace. Additional expenses were 
often required to defend their empire from completing European economic powers wishing to 
exploit, illicitly trade in, and privateer treasure shipments.  
 By the mid-17th century, the Spanish Empire was in a broad decline. The Thirty-Years 
War with the Dutch had led to even costlier war with France. This in turn depleted treasure, hurt 
trade, and interfered with commercial growth and expansion. Contrary to traditional historical 
narratives, Spain and her colonial holdings did not exclusively rely upon the extensive silver and 
gold mining operations for its total revenue collection. Instead, especially in the late colonial 
period, domestic trade and consumption were favorite targets of the imperial revenue collection 
machinery. The Empire relied strongly on indirect taxation, customs, alcabalas and sisas 
(internal trade and consumption taxes).29 European adversaries frequently attacked shipping and 
commercial targets in Spanish America to hurt and stunt colonial trade among competing 
military enemies, which in turn impacted its tax revenues and the national treasury. 
With losses of revenue, and in a state of near constant warfare, the Spanish government 
was forced to increase the tax burden placed upon its population. With increasing taxation, 
conscription into military service, and a failing economy, the people revolted and further 
fractured Spanish holdings in Europe and on the Iberian Peninsula. Entering into the 18th century 
the Spanish Empire was no longer the preeminent power in Europe---and faced another 
challenge, the death of King Charles the II, the last of the Spanish Habsburgs. 
                                               
29 Grafe, Regina, and Alejandra Irigoin. "A Stakeholder Empire: The Political Economy of Spanish Imperial Rule in 
America." The Economic History Review 65, no. 2 (2012). 612.  
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On November 1st, 1700, Charles the II of Spain died without a child heir to his throne. 
While he laid dying, Charles the II bequeathed his throne to the Bourbon claimant Philip of 
Anjou, grandson of Louis the XIV of France.30 Within two years King Philip V was embroiled in 
the War of Spanish succession against the nation states which desired to keep Philip from 
merging the Spanish and French Empire. Much of Europe feared that a combined French-
Spanish state would lead to an aggressive French Empire, supplied by vast amounts of Spanish 
gold and silver.  
 Rallying around the Austrian Hapsburgs, a combined group of European allies went to 
war to prevent the merging of the two empires in 1702. The War of Spanish Succession ended in 
1713 and lasted so long that continental Europe was in ruins. Great Britain emerged as the sole 
winner, having adopted a policy of limited involvement, an idea known as the Blue Water 
strategy.31 The Treaty of Utrecht brought an end to the War of Spanish Succession, leaving Spain 
without much of its European holdings. Furthermore, the British were granted the much coveted 
Asiento rights.32  
 With the loss of its holding in Europe, Spain became even more protectionist when it 
came to trade in its New World holdings. The wealth of the Indies had long been the most 
distinctive resource of the Spanish monarchy before 1700 and continued to be so thereafter.33 
                                               
30 Kuethe, Allan J. The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century. War and the Bourbon Reforms, 1713 
1796. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 1. 
31 Hargreaves-Mawdsley, W. N. Eighteenth-century Spain, 1700-1788, 35. 
32 Asiento had been granted to a number of European powers since the 1500s. It was coveted as it granted a country 
a monopoly to trade slaves in the Spanish Indies. Furthermore, it allowed for some of the slave ships to carry 
additional goods and licensed a trading vessel once a year to the Spanish Indies. Both the country or company 
awarded the Asiento stood to make a profit on traded goods, as did the Spanish Monarchy.   
33 Storrs, Christopher. The Spanish Resurgence, 1713-1748. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016. 105. 
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New Spain, Peru and the Caribbean holdings brought a diverse set of economic revenue that 
benefited the treasury in the form of hard bullion, trade duties, levies and taxes.   
First British Empire 
There is little to no dispute that there was a First British Empire, followed by a Second 
Empire. Geographically, the First British Empire was an Atlantic Empire based on North 
America and the West Indies.34 This Empire was based upon a system of commercial expansion, 
trade, and mercantile growth. It reached its apogee after the Seven Years' War and was then the 
richest and most extensive maritime empire that the world had ever seen, the envy of the 
Western world.35  
Eventually, the First British Empire came to a close when its thirteen colonies rebelled 
and expelled the British from their significant North American holdings. While still holding onto 
Canada and islands in the West Indies, the overall loss of its most profitable and largest colonies 
shifted the British focus and attention from the West to the East. However, there are differing 
views on how long the First British Empire lasted, from its date of inception to is eventual 
demise some historians place its end at the end of the 18th century, while others expand it out to 
the early portion of the 19th century. Either way, the timeframe is secondary to the overall 
historical views on trade, colonial governance, and social aspects of the Empire for this study, as 
it is focused on events starting in the late 17th century to the middle of the 18th century. Form a 
historical view, there are two leading schools of thought that encompass the study of First British 
                                               
34 Louis, William Roger, Robin William Winks, and Alaine Margaret Low. The Oxford History of the British 
Empire. Vol. V. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 43. 
35 Blake, J. W. "The First British Empire A Maritime Empire of Trade, Built by Traders." History Today 22, no. 8 
August 1972. 541. 
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Empire; they are The Imperial School and Anglo-Centric view. Both offer insight and 
perspective into 18th century trade and diplomacy.36 
Imperial School 
The Imperial school is a United States centric approach to the study of the First British 
Empire. It is noted that Americans had long before relegated their membership in the British 
Empire to a special "colonial period" of American history.37 This Imperial Study often is more 
narrowly focused and places considerable attention to governance, independence and rebellion 
within the thirteen original colonies. The first generation of American historians, like William 
Gordon, David Ramsay, and Mercy Otis Warren, demonstrated the tension between the desire to 
establish the intellectual autonomy of their subject and the demand that the history of American 
independence be written as a ratification of the new republic and its values.38 This has then 
created a narrative that focuses on the perceived injustice and subjugation of the American 
colonist at the hands of their powerful imperialistic government. Trade issues and taxation often 
are cited as causal effects for the rebellion, which is why it is important to understand how trade 
in the new world was forged and established.  
Within the framework of the Imperial School, the American historical enterprise from an 
early date was consciously built around positivism, a methodology only recently assailed by a 
variety of forms of subjectivist relativism.39 Leo Strauss is considered the most influential 
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thinker and historian in this arena. His diagnosis of the crisis of the West as a loss of belief in its 
purpose and superiority was one that he traced to late modern doctrines that denied the 
possibility of a rational knowledge of the universal validity of any purpose or principle.40 Strauss 
tended to uplift and almost worship the Founding Fathers and their role in creating the United 
States and breaking free from the shackles of Empire.  
Not all Imperial School researchers solely focus on the role of independence and 
rebellion. Charles McLean Andrews and Lawrence Henry Gipson state that the essential feature 
of early American society was its imperial institutions; its primary activity was participation in 
the trade and politics of empire. Implicitly, American colonial identity was forged within these 
contexts.41 It should also be noted that scholars from the United States that focus on the Imperial 
School of thought and research have played a commanding role in the historiography of the First 
British Empire, and thus cannot be easily dismissed in research and study about the era.42 While 
this study focuses on trade within the West Indies, the Imperial view, with a focus on the 
evolution and breakaway of the thirteen colonies, is not a critical point of view for this study. 
One of the great issues with the Imperial view is the lack of inclusion of West Indies holdings 
and their impact upon empire. While some modern historians try to now bring the West Indies 
into the expanded research of the First British Empire, often, it is done with a focus on the 
African slave trade or native subjugation, and not mercantile expansion. 
Classical historians still offer up and explain why the history of West Indies trade and 
expansion is important to those who study American history. Charles M. Andrew, in his book 
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The Colonial Period of American History noted that in order to understand the First British 
Empire and the origin of the United States can only be seen and understood in terms of all the 
British colonies in America, and of their relations with each other and with the mother country.43 
Thus, this paper does provide some expanded information on British economic desires in the 
West Indies as it did directly impact the evolution of the United States, yet, it does not expand 
into the upper North American Thirteen Colonies. Instead the paper maintains focus on the 
desires of the British and its merchants on gaining access to valuable Spanish trading territory. 
While Britain had turned to focus on commercial growth in the Americas, there were different 
views on how to best exploit its overseas colonies, and they differed from their quest to gain 
access into the profitable market of the Spanish South Seas.  
Anglo-Centric 
Imperial History maintains a focus on administrative and diplomatic elites and the 
political and strategic interests of the metropolitan powers.44 The term Anglo-centric is meant to 
accentuate the focus on the Nation of Britain; it’s diplomatic, economic, protectionist and 
mercantilist approach to establishing the First British Empire. It further emphasizes the role of 
Britain in the rise of economic power and tends to relegate its colonial activities as a means to 
gain wealth for the state, not focus on the development of the impacted colonial society. The 
view is focused on the push of mercantilism, and it can be justified by looking over historical 
material from the era, such as the Navigation acts of 1663. The Acts clearly position colonies as 
being kept to be more beneficial and advantageous… to further (gain) employment and increase 
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English shipping and the number of seamen. Furthermore, the Lord Commissioners reported 
that, the great object of colonizing upon the Continent of North America has been to improve 
and extend the commerce, navigation, and manufactures of this Kingdom, upon which its 
strength and security depend.45  
J.F. Rees, in his 1925 paper, “The Phases of British Commercial Policy in the Eighteenth 
Century,” notes that when discussing commercial and mercantile interests in Britain that “The 
temptation to find a single clue to a complexity of events is one which the historian resists with 
some difficulty.”46 Rees focuses on the complexity of trade, commerce, and diplomacy between 
Britain, France, and Spain. Furthermore, he states, “the eighteenth century cannot be treated as a 
single period dominated by one set of ideas. In the first part of the century, commercial policy 
was not clearly defined.”47 Rees contends that often British willingness to aggressively negotiate 
and seek war to gain an economic advantage was based upon the thought that trade was in decay.  
British historians and those even within the Anglo-centric view, often shift quickly away 
from the focus of commercial and mercantile interests, especially in the West Indies, and shift 
research focus to understand the growth of an Imperial Empire. The researchers and historians 
often focus on the impact of the British gaining greater possession of North American territory 
when discussing the First British Empire, and less about trade with rival economic empires. 
Stephen Webb, Lawrence Gipson, and Charles Andrew are of this view. They speak of the 
colonial policy of mercantilism, but then focus on the British Empire’s shift towards a new and 
untested policy of imperialism. Daniel Baugh does discuss and highlight the tightening of 
commercial regulation in the colonies and the willingness of the crown to deploy the navy, to 
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protect commercial interest, but again fails to offer more in-depth research or highlight Anglo-
Spanish issues in the West Indies.48  
The focus of research in any of the First Empire Studies has often shifted away from 
Anglo-Spanish disputes and instead lean towards the Imperial School of thought. However, for 
all its lack of precision, the concept and study of the First British Empire have proven to be a 
useful and even indispensable study for over 150 years, and still key to the historical 
interpretation of the period.49 Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the Anglo-Centric view is 
the primary device used to explain the diplomatic, mercantile and trade interests that drove the 
British Empire towards economic expansion.  
Research Focus 
The study of diplomacy concerning access to economics in the early 18th century has 
become a neglected historical field. In general, diplomatic history has often been degraded as the 
dry record “of what one clerk wrote to another clerk,” even though what the bureaucrat inscribed 
may have impacted on numerous lives.50 Jeremy Black states, “Eighteenth-century British 
foreign policy has been a marginal subject for several decades,” and that the “great age of 
foreign policy studies was the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth, an era in which 
history existed to study the growth and exalt of the nation.”51 During this era of diplomatic study 
researchers often neglected or left out foreign sources and their role in negotiations and their 
                                               
48 Louis, W. The Oxford History of the British Empire, 49. 
49 Ibid, 52. 
50 Carmona, Salvador, Rafael Donoso, and Stephen P. Walker. "Accounting and International Relations: Britain, 
Spain and the Asiento Treaty." Accounting, Organizations and Society35, no. 2 (2010). 254. 
51 Black, Jeremy. “British Foreign Policy in the Eighteenth Century: A Survey.” Journal of British Studies, vol. 26, 
no. 1, 1987. 24. 
22 
 
professional and private communications. Furthermore, these foreign sources were not included 
due to lack of access for the researchers of the era.  
 However, digitalization of records and greater access to these documents have allowed 
for new research to start in the field of diplomacy and foreign affairs. Access to these records 
also allows researchers with new and differing views on diplomacy and trade. There are differing 
schools of thought on what elements or people need the most attention when it comes to the 
study of British 18th-century diplomacy. The researchers of the late 19th and early 20th-Century 
often focused on a small number of influential men of the era, the “five men and the Duke of 
Newcastle”52 approach. Many, but not all, researchers often overlooked domestic and 
commercial pressures being exerted upon the government. Instead, they focused on a select few 
of the men of the era and their diplomatic and political skills. In contrast, this research looks to 
expand the viewpoint of those involved in diplomatic exchange and negotiations, and further 
provide the Spanish positions in a greater context.  
 The focus of the research is to look at the difficulties of Anglo-Spanish diplomacy in the 
era of the growing British Empire wanting to gain access to the wealthy Spanish New World, 
and a reemerging Spanish Empire seeking to protect its holdings. The timeframe to be studied 
will start in 1712, the end of the War of Spanish Succession and the establishment of the treaty 
of Utrecht, to 1742 the End of the War of Jenkin’s Ear and the start of the War of Austrian 
Succession. This timeframe is used for the framework of the study for many reasons. The British 
Empire was by this point in history deeply entrenched in the idea and concepts of mercantilism, 
and the fear of being cut out or conquered by other European powers was at the forefront of 
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political and diplomatic thinking. The Spanish Empire sought to reestablish itself as a powerful 
European State and could only do so with access to capital and a steady source of revenue to 
keep its treasuries full. Thus, the Spanish were highly protective of its holdings and sought to 
heavily restrict access and became diplomatically ridged on this stance as they too understood 
wealth was equal to power.  
 This study will show that vague and ambiguous treaty language often left open loopholes 
that the British willingly used to exploit access to trade in the West Indies and in Spanish 
controlled territories. Often, Spain sought to close these loopholes after each new treaty with 
Britain, However, constant shifting in Spanish governance and diplomacy often left an unclear 
foreign policy goals, which Britain often used to their advantage in order to exploit and try and 
gain greater trading concessions and access. Often, the only diplomatic or policy goal of Spain 
seemed to be consistent with was that of trying to keep Britain out of the West Indies. The 
British had an advantage throughout this period. Britain found itself under a rather stable cadre 
of leaders and had firm policy goals in which they were steadfast in approaching. Prime Minister 
Walpole and his government had found themselves a diplomatically secure position with their 
rivals, and sough to expand their global economic reach. However, those goals often were overly 
pushed by the powerful merchant class and trading companies that were willing to push for war, 
or simply violate existing treaty regulations, instead of waiting for long diplomatic processes to 
come to any sort of successful outcome. Both nations could have both economically benefitted 
by peaceful trade over that of war and illegal trade.  Spain would have collected duties and taxes 
on goods that the British were selling to their colonies, goods that Spanish merchants knew they 
could not provide in vast quantity as needed. Britain would have stayed out of debt that was 
often incurred during military actions, and merchants would not have to fear their trade to be 
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disrupted due to war or seizure of goods when they would be caught in smuggling activities. Yet, 
both nations continued to adhere to the mercantilist policies of the era, and both paid for that 
adherence in blood and treasure.  
The following chapters will focus on the treaties that shaped Anglo-Spanish trade during 
this time frame, including the importance of the South Seas Company gaining the right to the 
Asiento. The Asiento is of key importance as it was the key that opened the door to British 
merchant and trade access to the Spanish colonies in a legal way. Each chapter of the study will 
focus on the men who were in power of the respective nation states. Analyzing their motives and 
the pressures out upon them by different interests’ men’s decisions often had an influence that 
either lead a nation to war, or diplomacy. These competing powers and ideologies will be studied 
using written correspondence, pamphlet writings and debates upon the floor of the commons or 
royal courts. The increase in British illicit trade and its impact upon diplomacy between the two 
powers will be studied through treaty language, writings, and the view from those in colonial 
positions and in the royal courts. Lastly, the study will seek to find which method of diplomacy 
by the British Empire gained greater access to the Spanish holdings in the New World whether 
through negotiated settlements during times of peace, or through Gunboat Diplomacy, again 
using treaty language.  
Chapter 2 
 1712-1720 
 
1712-1720 showed an evolution in British diplomatic methods and goals. With an 
alliance with France, Britain had the ability to look past the affairs of the European continent and 
focus upon empire expansion and commercial growth. Starting with the Treaty of Madrid in 
1667 and 1670, Britain was able to negotiate legal access to the Spanish New World, and in 1712 
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with the acquisition of the right to the Asiento, gain trading rights therein. This new access to the 
West Indies fueled a rapid expansion of illegal and illicit trade in the Spanish territories, creating 
competition for Spanish trade goods in the region. Furthermore, the rise of the powerful South 
Seas Company impacted both British governance and diplomacy as the company was increasing 
involved in British political life as many Ministers and even the monarchy had a finical stake in 
the company. 1712-1720 saw new leadership rise in both nations. Britain soon found itself lead 
by a new, foreign, Monarch. Spain had finally solidified its new king’s right to govern. Both 
countries during this time saw Ministers in both governments gaining and establishing new 
powers, such as the role of Prime Minister being established in Britain.  
  In 17th and 18th-Century Britain and Europe, it was understood that foreign policy was 
primarily the responsibility of the Monarch.53 Parliament was seen as unwieldy when it came to 
discussing delicate state matters, as they often lack the ability to come together to agree on most 
issues they were responsible for. Parliament as a body also lacked the connections which the 
royal family often maintained through relation and friendship. John Snell, a Tory MP from 
Gloucester, once stated during a Parliamentary debate in 1716 that, “by the known and standing 
law of the land, the right of making peace and war, treaties and alliances, are undeniably the 
King's prerogative; and his Majesty may exercise that right, as to him seems best; and most for 
the good and benefit of his people, without application to Parliament, either to approve.”54   
Although the monarch was universally recognized as the constitutional authority in the 
matter of relations with other states, they were provided with a formal departmental structure to 
assist them.55 However, during the Reign of Queen Anne, the Whigs and members of the public 
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started raising concerns over the possibility that British interests were being subordinated to 
those of Hanover as the government was to the possibility of European action in favor of the 
Stuarts, and with as much and at times as little cause.56 This caused members of Parliament, and 
in the Foreign Office, to seek greater impute and oversight of how diplomatic functions and 
negotiations were being handled to ensure that the British State’s interests were just as forefront 
as to those of the royal family’s. These conflicts created new nuances and issues when it came to 
foreign policy as now Parliamentarians’ political objectives, pressures of the merchant classes, 
and the voice of the people all started to play a role in the push for war, peace, and trade.  
 Discussions on policy, foreign affairs, and all manner of debates were no longer held 
merely in offices, palaces, and government buildings, but in the open using the quickly growing 
print media. Discussions and debates in print were heated, more so in times leading up to the 
opening of hostilities and the near conclusion of them. Many in government felt that the writers 
and editors desire to debate every policy and action of the government and the monarchy in 
every affair was detrimental to the wellbeing of the nation as a whole. These leaders and rulers 
saw the writers as stirring up an excitable population through spreading misinformation, over 
aggrandizing issues and stories, and the use of inflammatory language. However, those in 
Parliament often used the print media to plead their cases or disparage their political enemies. 
This created a new dynamic in which politicians, legislatures, and diplomats had to function 
within to peruse an agenda. Eventually, with the rise of the Walpole-Townsend government, 
diplomatic efforts were often driven by whoever held the position of Foreigner Minister and they 
too would use the print media to sway public opinion to achieve their goals.  
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 There were, of course, other factors that played into foreign policy decisions, the main 
one being trade. Mechanistic trade policies and the desire to protect national trade over that of 
free trade often created conflicts between the powerful empires of the Era. Therefore, the real 
difficulty in managing foreign policy lay in navigating around the artificial system of 
international trade regulations, which frequently lead to most of the great wars of the eighteenth 
century.57 Furthermore, the British were keen on expanding their trade at all costs and often did 
so with little regard for how opposing nations would take their intrusion into their colonies. The 
British found the most success in the Spanish colonies as Spain was a poor shopkeeper, and her 
colonies, seeing they could not get supplied from the home stores, went elsewhere. Spanish 
custom-house officials connived at the importation of English goods; and so great were the 
profits to be gained by trading with the Spanish colonies that Englishmen were willing to risk 
even the loss of their ears. Where the advantage is considerable enough, men will always be 
found to risk life and limb; and when a law is in opposition to the will of the whole people, it will 
always be broken.58 
 The desire for profit and control over international trade soon become the primary goal of 
British foreign policy, and the tools they sought to use was diplomacy first to gain the 
concessions they felt entitled to. They found success in a number of treaties from 1667-1712, but 
often fell short in achieving their overall goals of access to the Spanish New World. The balance 
of power over the European continental matters came in a close second. With many of the long 
standing British leading politicians such as Sunderland and Stanhope leaving office due to health 
issues, or simply dying, Sir Robert Walpole and Charles Townsend found themselves in a 
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position to consolidate power with the Whigs. With this power Walpole sought to peace and 
diplomacy as his primary tool to achieve British expansion. In Spain, Julio Alberoni also found 
himself in a strong position in the Spanish court and used it to push the Queen’s desires and the 
Spanish protectionist attitudes that often-hampered peaceful negotiations with Britain. Therefore, 
with robust economic forces in Britain pushing for an expansion of trade, and the Spanish 
diplomatic corps often in disarray and unable to overcome protectionist ideals, war always took 
over when slow diplomatic negotiations failed to make quick headway. This was the course of 
Anglo-Spanish diplomacy in the early 18th-century.  
Treaty of Madrid 1667 & 1670, the Foundation of Anglo-Spanish Trade Treaties, and 
Negotiations in the 18th-Century 
 
 The Treaties of Madrid were not 18th-Century treaties; however, their influence on 18th 
century Anglo-Spanish trade and future trade negotiations is undisputed.59 The formal 
recognition of English holdings in the New World opened up valuable trading routes for the 
English. The problems created with these negotiations, however, raised points of contention 
between the Anglo-Spanish that never adequately addressed in the treaties, and when issues were 
attempted to be addressed, the language used was vague and unclear at times. The British and 
Spanish engaged in a number of wars after The Treaty of Madrid, and when each war came to a 
close and peace negotiations there was a recognition that previously vague language that had led 
to conflicts needed clarification. If this had been done sufficiently and with due diligence 
between both parties, many of the conflicts between 1712-1742 mat have been averted.  
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 Sir Edward Mountagu, The Earl of Sandwich (1625-1672)60, began negotiations with the 
Spanish diplomat Gaspar de Bracamonte y Guzmán, 3rd Count of Peñaranda (1595-1676)61 in 
Spain. The 1667 Treaty is of particular importance as it dealt with the bulk of commercial 
disputes between Britain and Spain. Published sometime between 1660-1664, the pamphlet "The 
humble Complaint of Merchants and others His Majesty of England's subjects of... losses under 
which they have lain by the King of Spain's breach of articles together with some proposals to 
the future" aired many of the British merchants’ grievances with the Spanish.  The merchants 
complained that “that there should be free commerce in all ports and places by sea or land of 
either King and reciprocal friendship and kindness among their subjects as it was before the war 
between Queen Elizabeth and King Philip the Second.62 The merchants were eager to gain 
favored nation trade status with the Empire of Spain, as favored nation status allowed for quicker 
processing time through port and harbors, freedom from detailed ship inspections, a safe harbor 
in the times of tempest weather and essential ship repairs, and favorable taxation and duty rates. 
The Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and Spain was negotiated by Sir William 
Godolphin (1635-1696) and Spain’s top English diplomat throughout the latter half of the 17th 
century, Gaspar de Bracamonte y Guzmán. The treaty was signed in Madrid 13-23 May I667, 
and is commonly known as the Commercial Treaty of that year. This treaty managed to secure 
for England the sought after direct trade concessions and numerous East Indies trade 
concessions.63 Once fully negotiated and signed, the British Merchants gained much for what 
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they requested. The 1667 Treaty of Madrid commercially laid the foundations of robust trade by 
re-opening trade in the dominions of the two Crowns "where hitherto trade and commerce have 
been accustomed.64 The British merchants gained the same rights and privileges when trading as 
native Spanish trades, however, with restrictions on trading in the West Indies. The British 
merchants were free from embargos, unfair taxation, and even granted limited rights to export 
bullion from the West Indies back to England. Additionally, fishery access in the Western 
hemisphere was agreed to, and Britain gained important economic access to its North American 
holdings.  
During the negotiations, a right was reserved by the Spanish to search British merchant 
ships sailing near the ports in the West Indies and the seas belonging to the respective countries. 
The Spanish would then legally be able to search and confiscate smuggled goods. The 
negotiators soon started to dispute the construction of this article, as it had been written in 
purposely vague terms that could be abused and misconstrued. The Spaniards claimed the right 
of search in all the American seas; the English contended that the phrase “contraband goods, 
according to the general interpretation, implied only arms and military stores sent to the states of 
Barbary, with which Spain maintained incessant war.65” Furthermore, the issue of what lands 
were actually British, and recognized as such by Spain in the New World, was an unsettled 
manner. This would be resolved in the 1670 Treaty of Madrid.  
Peace was short lived between the two Empires when the English privateer Captain 
Henry Morgan (1635-1688) in 1668 sacked the city of Portobello in Panama. Spain was so 
incensed that the Spanish Ambassador, the Count of Molina threatened to leave London. The 
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English, King Charles the II, knowing in 1669 that Spain was weak, disorganized, holding no 
advantages during this time, was not seeking war with England. The King therefore dispatched 
the diplomat Sir William Godolphin (1635-1696)66 to Madrid to negotiate for peace between the 
two powers and formally end the Anglo-Spanish War. England was seeking to be proactive in 
offering a diplomatic solution as it was seeking to maintain the peace to protect the already shaky 
Anglo-Spanish trade had been established in 1667. Sir Godolphin was met in Madrid to negotiate 
with Gaspar de Bracamonte, a man already familiar to Sir Godolphin when he had worked under 
Lord Sandwich. The treaty solidified English territorial gains and changed the West Indies region 
when it came to commercial access and security.  First and foremost, it was agreed that: 
The Most Serene King of Great Britain, his Heirs and Successors, shall have, hold, keep, and enjoy 
forever, with plenary right of Sovereignty, Dominion, Possession, and Propriety, all those Lands, 
Regions, Islands, Colonies, and places whatsoever, being situated in the West Indies, or in any part 
of America, which the said King of Great Britain and his Subjects do at present hold and possess, 
so as that in regard thereof or upon any color or pretense whatsoever, nothing more may or ought to 
be urged, nor any question or controversy be ever moved, etc.67 
 
 The adoption of the Treaty of Madrid between the two powers was the first time that the 
Spanish formally recognized the English claims to various holdings in the Americas, most 
importantly those in the West Indies. In 1655, the English seized the island of Jamaica from the 
Spanish and turned it into a profitable sugar colony and base of operations for privateering and 
smuggling. Having the island recognized by Spain as a legitimate holding of the English secured 
the island officially. It was found that Jamaica was perfectly situated to be used as a harbor for 
the English economic expansion in The West Indies. This once pirate-infested island became the 
base from which English merchants carried on a much-desired trade with Spanish America. The 
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British Jamaicans sold the Spaniards provisions, manufactured goods, and slaves; and in return, 
they received a steady stream of silver and gold that enriched England and supplied her 
continental colonies with most of their hard money.68 Silver was generally regarded as the metal 
best suited to form the national currency in the 17th-century, and England's demand for it greatly 
exceeded her supply. Every year vast quantities of bullion were shipped away in the course of 
East Indian trading but, it was not replenished through those same routes.69 
 The treaty of Madrid granted the English merchants and traders free trade with Spain and 
gave the merchants permission to begin and carry on Spanish commerce, and these merchants 
were open to buy, sell, and exchange merchandise of any sort, of what value and quantity they 
pleased. It was stipulated that this trade, however, did not include the West Indies. In fact, in the 
treaty of Madrid it is explicit that English subjects were only allowed the same trade concessions 
and access that Spain granted to the Dutch in 1648 under the Treaty of Munster. In the Treaty of 
Madrid it is stated that:  
As to for what concerns the West Indies, the subjects and inhabitants of the kingdoms, provinces, 
and Lands of the aforesaid Lords King and States respectively, shall refrain from journeying to and 
trading in all harbors and places held and possessed by either party with fortresses, residences, 
castles, or otherwise; to wit, the subjects of the aforesaid Lord King shall not journey to and trade 
in the harbors and places which are held by the aforesaid Lords States, nor the subjects of the 
aforesaid Lords States in those which are held by the aforementioned Lord King.70 
 
In other words, the Eight Clause of the Treaty of Madrid stated flatly that the subjects of 
the two crowns would maintain no trade with one another in the West Indies.71 While this was a 
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disappointment on many levels for traditional traders and merchants in Britain who were seeking 
access in the highly profitable sphere, these interested parties did gain a significant foothold in 
the Spanish Indies. With that foothold, the Royal African Company, and its new connections in 
the Caribbean, partnered with Portugal and became the primary source for slaves in the West 
Indies.72 To try and exploit the number of Spanish ships that would be entering the Jamaican 
ports to buy slaves, Sir Jonathan Atkins, the Governor of Jamaica in 1674, wrote to the 
Lordships of Trade and argued that, “as a maxim that wheresoever you intend to plant a new 
colony you must make their port a free port for all people to trade with them that will come.”73 
Sir Atkins, in direct opposition to the language of the Treaty of Madrid and British Navigation 
Acts, sought to trade with any Spanish, or any other foreign vessel, in the new port he now 
governed.74 Illegal trade had been a long-standing practice by the people of Jamaica, although 
often not openly talked about, that had enriched many a British merchant and pirate in Jamaica. 
Illegal trade also supplied a number of areas of the Spanish Empire in the West Indies that were 
consistently lacking access to Spanish supplies. Sir Atkins’s sin was directly advertising the 
intention to break the law, treaty obligations, and the promise by Britain to end piracy and 
smuggling in the region. This forced Sir Atkins to be summoned back to England where he 
promptly lost his governorship.  
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The Path to Utrecht 
 
 At the end of the War of Spanish succession and with the adoption of the Treaty of 
Utrecht, issues of trade in the West Indies dominated Anglo-Spanish relations for the next thirty 
years. Further, peace did not extend to the European continent; Britain and Spain would fight 
many wars over Italy and other territories Spain wished to recoup after the War of Spanish 
Succession. During this time England went from having a negligible trading presence in Europe 
and the West Indies to, by the beginning of the 1700s, having a highly complex and global 
trading presence. No other country, aside from the Dutch, relied upon overseas foreign trade for 
such a high proportion of its employment and gross national product.75 It was therefore crucial to 
the British to reduce piracy and privateering to a minimum, as those in power who once 
sponsored, encouraged, and profited from piracy and profiteering were more intent on enjoying 
the profits of empire and regular trade, and less willing to suffer losses from uncontrolled 
brigandage.76  
Trade had suffered immensely in the West Indies when piracy and profiteering were 
allowed to run amok, and the Treaty of Madrid had sought to end its hampering influence on 
legal and safe trade. Between 1697-1701 the English Empire first acted to suppress piracy in 
distant waters. Combating piracy allowed for the growing imperial government to demonstrate 
its increasing power and rights to defend and control colonial commerce.77 Furthermore, it was 
meant to prevent other colonial ports and government officials from attempting to run vast and 
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complex smuggling rings out of its ports in violation of the Navigation Acts. The Navigation 
Acts of 1651 and 1660 were a series of laws enacted to eliminate Dutch trading competition in 
English colonial markets. It stipulated what goods were allowed to be shipped throughout the 
Empire, the national composition of crews, and the restriction of non-English ships from trading 
in the colonies.   
With the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession on the European continent, England 
readily supported and encouraged privateering again. Adding privateering as a weapon of war 
was allowed or encouraged by governments because commercial-raiding or preying on private 
property at sea was still regarded as a legitimate war aim.78 Officials argued that maritime attacks 
on the enemy’s colonies and trading routes (during war) were the best methods for bringing a 
power, such as Spain, to bear, and that such attacks would make war a profitable or self-
financing enterprise.79 Spain and France benefited greatly from Spanish-American trade, and 
gold and silver shipments from the West Indies. Thus, it was in Britain’s interest to strangle 
those supplies and hurt their economies as much as possible while engaged in open warfare. 
After the Treaty of Utrecht, privateering adventures again died down to establish safe trade in the 
West Indies.  
On Friday the 29th of January 1712, the peace congress in Utrecht congregated and 
opened formal negotiations to bring to an end twelve years of global warfare known as the War 
of Spanish Succession. The War of Spanish Succession had decimated large swaths of Europe. 
The Treaty of Utrecht pointed out that the war had been waged with the utmost force, at 
immense charge, and with almost infinite slaughter.80 At the time, some of the most massive 
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armies ever fielded fought in battles such as Blenheim, where 120,000 troops fought, and 
causalities were scored in the tens of thousands. Britain, being an island nation and maintaining a 
powerful navy to protect her country and its vast trading empire, was spared from much of the 
devastating impacts of the war.  
Furthermore, while Britain’s war and trading adversaries were debilitated by the twelve 
long years of conflict, British overseas trade had increased. The growth came about because of 
the 1708 Cruisers and Convoys Act which had bound the Royal Navy to allocate warships to 
protect merchantmen against foreign privateers and commercial raiders.81 With its trade and 
merchant shipping intact, Britain’s industrial and manufacturing centers were poised to become 
the economic powerhouse that could supply the European continent, and more importantly Spain 
and their colonies in the New World. Britain, in its peace negotiations, again sought to expand 
upon their relatively pitiful trade and merchant access to Spanish holdings, driven partially by 
the loss of lucrative Dutch and French trading access while negotiating the Barrier Treaty of 
1709.82  
Similar to developments in England, the economic interest of the various European 
governments and trading companies gained unprecedented importance during the Utrecht 
negotiations, making them the central driver of political decisions.83 European manufacturing 
grew on a much greater scale, thus driving the needs to have sustained access to raw materials to 
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power a country’s economic engine. Expanding and growing economies accelerated the need to 
expand into new lucrative and profitable markets in the West and East Indies. Thus, all the nation 
states sought trade concessions from each other to drive their economic engines. Britain sought 
to not be left behind. Not only did the British people improve and expand their manufacturing 
levels, they further developed their naval power too, in which they could ship, protect, and move 
their growing production capacity. Soon, only the Dutch merchant class could rival that of 
Britain, and Europe took notice.  
Britain’s Push to Negotiate for Peace 
 
During the War of Spanish Succession, Britain had become a major European power, and 
for the first time in her history, her home politics were of vital importance to Europe.84 Obtaining 
peace with Spain had become a contentious issue in Britain by 1709. The British Parliament had 
been deeply divided as to whether to sue for total peace or continue with the war directly with 
Spain. The Tories and Whigs were both keen to make peace and end the war against France; 
however, the Tories sought a full peace between Britain, Spain, and France. The Whigs had no 
intention of ending the war with Spain, however, continued war was indeed a detriment to the 
real interests of England.85 Queen Anne sought to end the war and supported the Tory position 
more thoroughly. She wrote a number of letters to her First Lord of the Treasury, Robert Harley 
the Earl of Oxford (1661-1724)86, who was the leader of the Tory party, expressing her keen 
desire to procure the Peace of Utrecht for her war-weary nation. In 1711, she wrote letters to the 
Earl of Oxford and explains that, “Lord Chamberlain [Shrewsbury] has talked a good deale to me 
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about the Peace, and I hope he will act very hartely in it” and that she was, “very glad to find 
things are in soe good a way abroad for the Peace."87 
The Queen, the Earl of Oxford and supporters in the government were seeking peace as a 
means of securing England’s interests that the long war had failed to achieve. On the opposite 
side stood the war general, John Churchill, the 1st Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722),88 and his 
Whig Cabinet allies who were adamant about continuing the fighting. King William earlier 
granted The Duke of Marlborough immense powers before he died to represent England both in 
war and matters of diplomacy. When Queen Anne took the throne, she too relied upon 
Marlborough’s talents and skill as a soldier and statesman, but soon, felt that Marlborough was 
continuing the war for greater military and personal prestige and that his actions were now 
starting to hurt the nation. Queen Anne, tired of the insolence of the Marlborough and concerned 
to preserve the essence of national integrity, dismissed the Whigs and sought to deprive them of 
power,89 thus turning over peace negotiations to a Tory, Henry St. John Viscount of Bolingbroke 
(1652-1742),90 who engaged in secret peace negotiations in France while Marlborough was still 
fighting in Europe. With Queen Anne no longer actively supporting Marlborough and instead 
leaning on Tory influence, the Whigs were thrashed in the general election, and the Tories 
secured new positions and power within the government. Furthermore, Marlborough, who had 
captured Boschian in September 1711, was then accused by the ruling Tories of speculation and 
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was replaced by James Butler, the 2nd Duke of Ormond (1665-1745),91 who did nothing to 
progress the war forward for the allies.92 
It is important to note the status by which party lines tended to fall. Tories were typically 
made up of those of the gentry caste that funded a large portion of the war through high taxation, 
and that money was spent servicing the debt. Tory papers, pamphleteers, and supporters saw that 
the future growth of the economy and power lied in the accumulation of land to drive profits. 
Therefore, their goals when seeking concessions during peace negotiations was to expand 
territorial gains for colonial expansion. For example, when discussing the south seas, Tories had 
hoped to acquire or establish gold and silver mines to pay off Whig financed sovereign debt. 
Tories also sought land accumulation to develop farms, trading posts, and other physical 
territories, as land equaled wealth and status. Tories, like their late seventeenth century 
predecessors, believed the key to securing Britain’s economic future lay in creating a territorial 
empire. Such an empire preserve the natural social order at home while guaranteeing that Britain 
could compete with any commercial power overseas.93 Therefore, when seeking peace with 
Spain or France, offering substantial trading concessions was not seen as detrimental to the 
British economy if territory and empire were secured and expanded under these agreements.  
Whigs tended to be merchants, financiers, and tradesmen who were profiteering off the 
war mostly through financing the debt which was paid back to them, with interest, through 
taxation. The merchant class was not immune from paying taxes in the form of customs and 
duties on the products they bought, sold, and shipped. Financing the debt was a highly profitable 
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venture, for the National Debt at the accession of Queen Anne in 1702 was £16,000,000 by 1714, 
after the Peace of Utrecht had been finalized, the National Debt had ballooned to £69,000,000.94 
The Whig financers indeed had motivations to oppose the peace process with the Spanish, as 
continual war meant greater borrowing from the government.  
Jonathan Swift, the eminent satirist, insisted in his published tract entitled “The Conduct 
of the Allies, and of the late Ministry in beginning and carrying on the Present War” that the 
War had been maintained by ‘the Fears of the Money-changers, lest their Tables should be 
overthrown,’ suiting ‘the Designs of the Whigs, who apprehended the Loss of their Credit and 
Employments in a Peace.95 Jonathan Swift’s  appeal directly to the public at large in his tract call 
for peace and argued that peace had not been obtained because of Whig war-mongering was to 
be blamed for unnecessarily prolonging hostilities. Swift furthered his argument and focused the 
failure of domestic party politics for peace not being realized at the moment, stated that ‘whether 
this War were prudently begun or not, it is plain, that the true Spring and Motive of it, was the 
aggrandizing a particular Family (the Churchills), and in short, a War of the General 
Marlborough and the Ministry (the Whigs), and not of the Prince or People.96 The Tories, 
fighting against Whig ideals and profiteering from the war, took up the “Country” concern. This 
position was built upon the uneasiness over the growing national debt, and rising taxes that had 
been expanding during wars with France and now with Spain. The Tories argued that the Whigs 
were attempting to establish a fiscal-military state.97 Furthermore, during the Nine Years War, 
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Junto Whigs had used the war to line their collective pockets, and the Tories were unwilling to 
give them another chance at war profiteering.   
The Treaty of Utrecht was acutely controversial in Great Britain. It was a Tory peace 
pushed through in the face of bitter Whig opposition which did succeed in watering down 
massive commercial rapprochements with France that was integral to Tory plans.98 Arthur 
Maynwaring (1668-1712), a prominent Whig writer and Minister of Parliament, claimed that the 
Tories had not done enough to try and restore the House of Habsburg to the Spanish throne, and 
that their failures were poised to allow the French to gain a trading monopoly in the Spanish 
Indies. The Whigs had sought to push for a larger and more expansive war with Spain in which 
they could achieve greater trading concessions, or press to put their preferred heir to govern over 
Spain. Whigs sought to place Charles the III on the throne as Maynwaring and James Stanhope 
(1673-1721), the 1st Earl of Stanhope who was an accomplish British solider, politician and 
diplomat, had negotiated a secret treaty which would have assured free and open Trade in 
Spanish America for English Merchants. But negotiations between numerous governments 
throughout Europe were firmly underway, and deviation could have collapsed the entire peace 
process. When it came to multinational war in Europe, often peace conferences and agreements 
were completed through bilateral peace, commerce, and military treaties. Often, these treaties 
reestablished going back to a status quo when it came to alliances and trade. Furthermore, full 
resolution could take years. Negotiations for Utrecht started in 1711 and did not fully concluded 
until 1715.   
Lastly, the War had gone from resounding British victories, to limited success on the 
battlefield, and then to stunning losses. Soon the allies saw that engaging in further combat might 
                                               
98 Lenman, Bruce P. Britain’s Colonial Wars 1688-1783. Harlow: Longman, 2001. 47. 
42 
 
have weakened the British and Allied positions when it came to suing for peace. These 
disagreements and contentions played out publicly in newspapers, tracts, and pamphlets 
produced by both parties and nation states. These were written to try and influence and change 
public opinion on the terms and process of settlement. During the time the Utrecht negotiations 
took place, society and public opinion were undergoing a profound change in which the social 
concepts questioning arcana imperii,99 and the public demanding to know if their leaders were 
acting for the common good.100The public found themselves deeply drawn into the debate and 
expressed an interest in how the negotiations were proceeding. The growing interests, in turn, put 
pressure from the public onto the parties and threatened to unseat a party if the other side was 
effectively able to sway the reading public’s opinions.  
Queen Anne, whose government had started the steps towards peace, died. King George I 
succeeded her and now inherited the final peace accords. King George felt that the Tories had 
betrayed him and abandoned the house of Hanover. Furthermore, the King saw the secret Tory 
negotiations as a betrayal of Britain’s allies that were formed to fight Spain and France. It should 
be noted that George I was not an ardent supporter of England when he first assumed power. 
King George was far more committed to the house of Hanover and to the position of the Allies 
that had fought the War of Spanish Succession. Therefore, when the Tory peace was completed 
at the exclusion of some of the Allies and negotiated in secret, the King was greatly offended and 
felt his interests had been overlooked. 
George, now harboring a strong distrust of the Tories, allowed the Whigs unprecedented 
control over governance. Their power was further cemented when the Whig ministers of Charles 
                                               
99 Latin for Secrets of the Empire 
100 Schmidt-Voges, I. New Worlds? 79. 
 
43 
 
Townshend, James Stanhope, and Robert Walpole successfully put down a 1715 Jacobite 
rebellion that attempted to depose George and replace him with William III.  Viscount 
Bolingbroke and other high-ranking Tories were actively engaged in the Jacobin plot to return 
the Stuarts to power in England. The scheme had failed, and the Whigs framed Tories as 
dangerous Jacobians who threatened to depose the King. This slur caused the Tories to fall out of 
favor with the general public and the King, forcing them to become a prescribed minority.101  
George also threatened architects of the Tory peace agreement at Utrecht with high 
treason and some of the leaders were questioned and most notably Robert Harley, the Earl of 
Oxford, was jailed for his role in the secret negotiations. He was eventually released, however, 
the dominant ruling core of the Whig party would be challenged when George I made his first 
trip back to Hanover, and a split occurred that threw some of the most prominent Whigs into the 
Tories embrace during the Whig Schism of 1717.  
 Once the issues of Spanish Succession had been settled, and a military peace had been 
obtained, Britain sought to further its reach into the Spanish American trade region. Britain had 
already gain favorable trading conditions directly with Spain in the European continent, 
however, it was apparent that Britain had a goal of gaining access to extract wealth from the 
West Indies. They legally gained this right through the Asiento, which was then Managed by the 
newly founded South Seas Company, and quickly used the Asiento as a cover to expand illegal 
trade in the area.  
 
 
                                               
101 Jones, Clyve. Britain in the First Age of Party, 1687-1750: Essays Presented to Geoffrey Holmes. New York, 
NY: Hambledon Continuum, 1987. 185. 
44 
 
Concessions Sought from Spain 
 
The negotiations of The Treaty of Utrecht settled some territorial disputes between Spain 
and Britain such as the ownership of Gibraltar, but much of it revolved around issues of trade.102 
Of the first order was to sign a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Great Britain and 
Spain.103 In this treaty, Britain was again afforded the same trading rights which they had 
enjoyed under The Treaty of Madrid. It was noted that the British were to enjoy: 
Free use of navigation and commerce between the subjects of each kingdom, as it was heretofore, 
in time of peace, and before the declaration of this late war, in the reign of Charles the Second (of 
glorious memory), Catholic King of Spain, according to the treaties of friendship, confederation, 
and commerce, which were for merly made between both nations, according to ancient customs, 
letters patent, cedulas, and other particular acts; and also according to the treaty or treaties of 
commerce which are now, or will forthwith be made at Madrid. And whereas, among other 
conditions of the general peace, it is by common consent established as a chief and fundamental 
rule, that the exercise of navigation and commerce to the Spanish West Indies should remain in the 
same state it was in the time of the aforesaid King Charles the Second.104 
 
One of the main goals for the British Tory government was to secure a significant share 
in the trade with the Spanish Empire to the relative disadvantage of Dutch and French rivals.105 
Desiring to gain dominance in trade was based around the economic belief that the balance of 
trade needed to be in a positive balance for a nation state, as a positive (trade) balance would be 
seen as signaling a healthy economy and a negative balance malaise.106 The Whigs had sought to 
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gain access to the valuable Spanish West Indies markets as traders would be paid in gold and 
silver bullion that the government could use in return to pay off sovereign debt. Under the 
negotiated terms of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Great Britain and Spain, the 
British gained no such advantage and were told by Spain that they were entitled to: 
Enjoy at least the same privileges, liberties, and immunities, as to all duties, impositions, or customs 
whatsoever, relating to persons, goods, and merchandizes, ships, freight, seamen, navigation, and 
commerce; and shall have the like favour in all things, as the subjects of France, or any other foreign 
nation, the most favoured, have, possess, and enjoy, or at any time hereafter may have, possess, or 
enjoy.107 
 
Without renegotiation of trading rights and privileges, Britain would have been forced to 
resume their same trading position as it was in 1680. The British, however, were not seeking to 
be restricted to merely free navigation in the West Indies and favored nation trade status with 
European Spain.  
To finally gain access to the Spanish West Indies, the British sought and acquired the 
rights to the Spanish Asiento in the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between Great Britain 
and Spain.108 The Asiento was Britain’s economic access to the West Indies as it allowed for the 
sale of slaves, and a yearly ship that was allowed to trade at the market in Portobello. The war-
weary, and almost bankrupt French and Spanish found themselves in a relatively weak position 
from which they could negotiate. England sought and obtained a thirty-year exclusive contract 
with Spain to Asiento which granted the British: 
The contract for introducing negroes into several parts of the dominions of his Catholick Majesty in 
America, commonly called el Pacto de el Asiento de Negros, for the space of thirty years 
successively, beginning from the first day of the month of May, in the year 1713, with the same 
conditions on which the French enjoyed it.109 
 
                                               
107 Macgregor, J. Commercial Tariffs and Regulations of the Several States of Europe and America, 36. 
108 This was signed in Utrecht on the 28th of November 1713. 
109 Sanz, Virginia Léon, and Niccolò Guasti. "The Treaty of Asiento between Spain and Great Britain." The Politics 
of Commercial Treaties in the Eighteenth Century, 2017. 151. 
46 
 
 The British gained the exclusive monopoly to trade slaves and a license that permitted 
one ship a year to openly trade in the Spanish West Indies.110 The Asiento privilege was limited 
to the importing annually of 4,800 negroes in America. Spain also gave England the right of 
entry to Portobello, and the guarantee which Spain would concede to no other nation of privilege 
for the commerce of the Indies.111 Though Spain had never managed to make money from this 
business, the Tory government had as few financial doubts as moral doubts about a trade that it 
was confident would help bring the country's budget, deep in deficit because of the war, back 
into balance.112 The long War of Spanish Succession had more than doubled the national debt to 
£36 million.113 Servicing this new debt soaked up a large percentage of the Nation’s annual 
expenditures.  
Thus, seeking more markets and income was in the interest of the British government. 
Additional amendments to Asiento soon included the British right and the added privilege of 
bringing back the "fruits" of their sales in goods, bullion, and coin. Under the terms, the king of 
Spain was to receive a fourth of the profits and five percent of the balance of the gain. The 
Spanish crown never held twenty-five percent of the company as initially stipulated. Instead 
King Philip V bore responsibility for a quarter cost of the company.114 Nothing in the 
negotiations favored the Spanish crown. The king was slated to be the last in line to receive any 
of the profits earned, and further, had to suffer the cost of any losses the company would incur, 
which was frequent as the Asiento would be found to be unprofitable. King Philip was alerted of 
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these pitfalls by Bernardo de Tinajero, one of the negotiators of the Asiento agreement. He 
warned King Philip that, without the profits from the smuggling of goods, the black slave trade 
simply was not a lucrative business.115  
A further commercial advantage was the annual ship, originally of five hundred tons 
burden, later of six hundred and fifty tons, in which English goods could be brought for sale at 
the annual fairs in Spanish America and Spanish goods could be shipped out in exchange.116 
Furthermore, the Asiento was highly coveted among the nations of Europe. When a country held 
the rights to the Asiento, the holders were guaranteed to a significant market and source of 
revenue in Spanish America, the possibility of trade in other goods and access to Spanish ports 
where that nation or it’s merchants might engage in the significant contraband trade in the area 
under the guise of legitimately trading in the parameters of the Asiento.117 One of the ways 
traders exploited the Asiento was bringing over large supplies of flour, wool, and other goods 
under the guise of supplying their factories they had established in various Spanish ports to 
supply slaves through. Furthermore, now that the British had gained the rights to the Asiento, the 
government needed an instrument that could engage in the new-found access to the Spanish West 
Indies.  
The South Sea Company 
 
The South Sea Company118 was initially established to resolve the government's ﬂoating 
debts contracted during the War of the Spanish Succession. Also, the Tories had set it up to act 
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as a counterweight to the Whig-dominated Bank of England and East Indies Company.119 The 
idea for a company to obtain an exclusive trading agreement with the Spanish goes back to 1707 
when James Stanhope, an English Diplomat, attempted to persuade the Spanish Archduke 
Charles to allow the British to engage in free trade in Spanish America using a specially formed 
company that would seek to replace French and Dutch trade in the region. The Dutch, however, 
found out about this attempt and diplomatically informed the British that this would breach the 
Treaty of the Grand Alliance and the idea was dropped by the English.120 The next plan to 
establish a new joint stock company for exclusive Spanish Indies trade was proposed to Robert 
Harley in October 1710 by John Blunt, George Caswell, and Ambrose Crowley. These men sold 
the idea as a joint stock company that was set up to solve the problem of the floating debts that 
had been accrued by a variety of government ministries and departments. The South Seas 
Company would convert the floating debt into company stock. This method was a standard 
means for dealing with government debt at that time and had already been practiced by the 
Whig-dominated Bank of England and East India Company.121  
The company was awarded the Asiento. As noted, this granted the company the highly 
prized exclusive rights to trade slaves to the Spanish American colonies. It was established via a 
statute passed early in the year 1711, and connects itself, on the one side, with a remarkable 
stipulation in the Treaty of Utrecht, and, on the other, with great calamities overtaking the British 
empire some years after the end of our period. It stands on the statute-book as “An Act for 
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making up deﬁciencies and satisfying the public debts; and for erecting a corporation to carry out 
a trade in the South Seas; and for the encouragement of the ﬁshery; and for liberty to trade in 
unwrought iron with the subjects of Spain; and to repeal the Acts for registering seamen.”122 
The Act proclaims that “it is of the greatest consequence to the honour and welfare of this 
kingdom, and for the increase of the strength and riches thereof, and for the vending of the 
product and manufacture, goods, and merchandises, of or brought into this kingdom, and 
employment of the poor, that a trade should be carried on to the South Seas and other parts in 
America within the limits hereinafter mentioned; which cannot so securely and successfully be 
begun and carried on, as by a corporation and joint-stock exclusive of all others.”123 
Furthermore, in the vicious world of international trade, England felt it could only compete if its 
joint-stock companies were awarded sovereign powers to enforce their monopolies and protect 
their exclusive trading privileges by whatever means necessary. This power allowed them to 
raise up military fleets and hire private troops or fund companies of British forces to protect their 
interests.  
The South Seas Company was composed of the most influential businessmen in England, 
such as Samuel Shepard, and men who later held powerful positions within the government, such 
as Robert Walpole and soon to be ambassador to Spain Sir Benjamin Keene. The Company was 
to issue stock and take over short-term public debts. In return, the government established a fund 
to pay the Company a tax-free annuity. With this annuity, the company was able to pay 5% 
interest on the issued stock. To drive and help investment in the South Seas Company, the 
government granted the Company a monopoly over all trade in the West Indies as a way to 
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induce investors to purchase stock. The South Seas Company would not only generate personal 
profits for the shareholders, but also provide capital for governmental loans that would help 
England promote a vigorous foreign policy that would include expanding commercial interests in 
the West Indies.124 Eventually, over speculation in the company would lead to the infamous 
South Seas bubble and create an economic calamity in Britain.  
The South Seas Company itself wielded a large amount of power in British politics and 
diplomacy in the later part of the 1730s. Eventually, the British South Seas Company worked as 
a semi-official body of the British government, and occupied an outstanding place in the 
relations between Spain and England.125 The South Sea Company was organized with the King 
of England as governor and majorities of the members of the court of directors for the company 
were active Ministers in the British Parliament.126 Because it had deep ties to officials within the 
British government, often the company’s issues became state issues. The blending of politics and 
money would eventually become a contributing factor to the War of Jenkin’s Ear.  
Spanish Governance and Diplomacy After Utrecht 
The War of Spanish Succession saw the decline of the Spanish power in Europe with the 
loss of much of the territory it controlled. The Spanish King was forced to renounce any claim to 
the French crown and found that many of her traditional allies had abandoned her. The British 
negotiators Doctor John Robinson (1650-1723),127 who held the position of first plenipotentiary, 
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and Lord Thomas Wentworth (1672-1739),128 Earl of Strafford, did not bend and balked at many 
of the Spanish demands, including refusing to give up Gibraltar and Italian territory Spain 
desired back. Furthermore, Spain was forced to formally recognize King George I as the rightful 
ruler of Britain, and to end their support to place a Stuart on Britain’s throne.  
After the war, Spain sought to consolidate and centralize power within the country. King 
Philip V being of French ancestry, found that the French model suited him for this 
reorganization. Madrid became his Paris, and political power was consolidated and monopolized 
by centralized bodies. Philip moved away from the Spanish systems of conciliar and instead 
introduce secretarial and ministerial capacities.129 Philip’s idea was to imitate the French model. 
This meant reconstructing the Armada, centralizing the administration, improving the roads. 
What was good for the monarchy was good for Spain. And what had strengthened the French 
monarchy would benefit the Spanish one as well”.130 Furthermore, it moved Spain towards 
economic modernization for the era. After the war, an audit was found that Spanish industry was 
almost dead, a consequence of the "alcabalas" and "millions" raising the cost of production to a 
point which rendered competition with foreign manufactures impossible.131 To be competitive 
again, almost all the bridges and roadways had to be, and were, improved as well as harbors and 
ports. The nation’s financial system was reviewed and adjusted. Furthermore, more competent 
administrators and diplomats needed to be appointed after the failure of the Spanish diplomatic 
corps to obtain positive concessions that were favorable to their country over that of Britain, 
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France, and Holland. However, reorganization often slowed or went unfinished during King 
Philip’s often mental episodes.  
It is understood that while King Philip V was the monarch of Spain, his failing mental 
and physical health often left him incapable of engaging in the duties of governance. Philip’s 
bouts with mental illness at times had led to total incapacitation. He had once, in 1724, abdicated 
his throne because of his ongoing mental health issues. Queen Elisabeth Farnese (1692-1766), 
anxious at her own future and that of her sons, was determined to keep Philip on the throne and 
destroyed his abdication document before it could be made public.132 Thus, the Queen was 
widely regarded in her day as the real driving force behind Spanish policy. Unfortunately, the 
Queen was also prone to persuing goals and plans that were of little value to Spain and its 
people.133 
Philip V, and more importantly Queen Elizabeth Farnese, had placed great trust in Julio 
Alberoni (1664-1752)134 to negotiate peace with Britain, and was constantly outwitted by the 
British negotiators. It was his diplomatic failures that solidified George’s claims, and he opted 
out of an invitation to join France, Britain, and the Netherlands to ally, further weakening 
Spain’s position in Europe. Now Spain faced the combined powers of those nations and had few 
backers and protectors of her own. Alberoni was a political pragmatist and not an intellectual, 
but he had the ability to influence the Queen of Spain to buy into his political and diplomatic 
schemes which would lead the nation into another series of wars just a few years later.135 With 
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the help of Special Financial Advisor Jean Orry (1652-1719)136, a Frenchman, Alberoni spent the 
next decade in an effort to modernize the Spanish government, commercial system, and trading 
mechanisms. A new system of four ministries had been established, consisting of War, State, 
Government, and Justice.137 In 1714, facing the abject corruption in the Indies, a Department of 
the Indies was formed. Even after his failings and eventual dismissal, other generations of 
Spanish reformers continued Alberoni’s work on rooting out corruption and focusing on 
modernization of all levels of Spanish governance.   
Now that war had ceased, Spain looked to renovate her economy and possessions by 
reclaiming her trade in the West Indies. The remittance of public revenues from the Indies had 
declined steadily to alarming levels.138 England, France and the Netherlands established large 
and rampant contraband, and smuggling rings in areas that Spain had failed to supply during the 
war of Spanish Succession. The British argued that if Spain only opened up the West Indies 
markets, illicit trade would not be needed and that the King of Spain himself would profit. Illegal 
and contraband trade arose because: 
The Spaniards (in the West Indies) finding that the established Method of trading from Old Spain 
to America, was not sufficient to supply the Wants, or at least to satisfy the Desires, of the 
Inhabitants of their Colonies there ; and that the Temptation to Foreigners to introduce European 
Goods, and to trade clandestinely on those Coasts, was very great; and that the Spanish Subjects 
likewise reaped great Advantages therefrom, and consequently the Revenues of the Crown of Spain 
must greatly suffer thereby.139  
 
                                               
136 Jean Orry was a well-respected economist and finance minister. Orr was key in reforming the Spanish tax system 
and helped implement many of the early economic reforms that were design to help the Spanish recover after the 
War of Spanish Succession.  
137 Kuethe, A. The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century. War and the Bourbon Reforms, 42.  
138 Ibid, 33. 
139 Roberts, J. Great-Britain's Complaints Against Spain Impartially Examin'd: And the Conduct of Each Nation, 
from the Treaty of Utrecht to the Late Declarations of War, Compared. To Which Is Added, an Abstract of the 
Several Treaties Which Have Been Entred Into Between the Two Crowns, So Far as They Relate to the Present 
National Disputes. London: Oxford-Arms in Warwick-Lane, 1739. 5. 
54 
 
The Spanish colonial bureaucracy was also rife with corruption and graft throughout the 
region. All levels of the colonial government were taking bribes and a personal cut of the 
contraband trade, and thus had a more significant stake in preserving the system than closing it 
down. In an effort to end the need for bribery, the crown established the Real Factoria de Indias, 
and institution controlled by the intendente general of the navy on behalf of the King.140 With the 
Factoria in place, Spain could now fund and pay the salaries of those in charge of ports and 
trading houses immediately instead of having to wait for the return voyages of the ships.  
However, even these steps did not stem the tide of illegal trade. Antonio de la Pedrosa, 
the man who was to establish and set up the system to allow for the first Viceroy to operate in the 
West Indies, had to choose to either stabilize and make the operations of the royal treasuries 
more effective and efficient, or fight corruption. De la Pedrosa initially met with Faustino 
Fajardo, a treasury official who had frequently and openly spoken against the rampant corruption 
by his fellow officials. De la Pedrosa interviewed the accused men and instead of finding out 
who the culprits were, was met only met with denials of any wrongdoing by the officials. 
Frustrated, de la Pedrosa instead focused his energies on ensuring that all cargo that entered the 
ports, illegal or not, was fully inspected, documented and that the merchants paid the applicable 
taxes on their goods.141 This at least would allow for the crown to more effectively extract 
revenue from the Indies and have it added to the treasury, not the pockets of local officials. 
Unlike Britain, the Spanish crown was seeking to deprive powerful corporations undue influence 
and power at the expense of the crown.  
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 Additionally, any attempts by the Spanish to shut down the illicit trade threatened the 
powers of England, France, and the Dutch who were profiting immensely off the illegal trade in 
the Indies. Any attempts to stem the illicit trade caused diplomatic strains with those powers who 
had just recently entered into a new powerful alliance to challenge Spain. Therefore, it was 
politically and diplomatically beneficial for illicit trade to continue unmolested in the West 
Indies. However, King Philip would again seek to expand and regain Spanish territorial holdings 
in Europe which would inflame the continent a few short years later.  
British diplomacy and focus saw major shifts during the years 1712-1720. Parliament had 
eroded the monarchy’s power in order to ensure that Britain was the focus and not overseas 
interests. Because of this, members of Parliament were able to more effectively push British first 
policies, and their own personal interests, when it came to matters of diplomacy and trade. The 
Stanhope-Sunderland government, under pressure and advice of the South Seas Company, 
pushed the king towards war with Spain over the perceived ideas that Spain was not adhering to 
the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht. British Foreign Minister Craggs, who was tasked with 
diplomatic duties with the Spanish government, made ultimatums based upon trade issues in the 
West Indies to keep the British out of the looming war.  However, the Spanish were still trying to 
rebuild their economy, and they saw economic protectionism in the West Indies as the path 
forward. Further fueling the flames of war was illegal British trading in the West Indies.  
Britain’s Governance and Diplomacy After Utrecht 
Under George I, future English diplomatic situations become complex, as at times it 
appeared English Sovereign was blatantly more interested in persevering and pushing the 
interests of his royal house and the members therein more than the interests of the country that he 
was responsible to govern and lead. The King kept what some have referred to as a dual cabinet, 
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with George maintaining an active group of ministers who were there to advise him on 
Hanoverian matters and interests and one set of advisors to look after British issues.  
The now leading and powerful Whigs made up of Charles Spencer (1675-1722)142, the 
Earl of Sunderland, James Stanhope, Robert Walpole, and Charles Townshend (1674-1738)143 
were still loyal Englishmen. These powerful and influential Whig ministers and leaders did not 
allow George I to have free reign when it came to diplomatic matters, especially when it came to 
war and trade. Parliament had experienced monarchs in the past who had put House above 
country and had passed the 1701 Settlement Act to prevent a Monarch from using British Power 
to pursue Continental and Royal interests over that of the electoral and domestic affairs. Fear of 
foreign royal power by Parliament was so profound that by the time George had taken the throne; 
he found that his power had been in certain respects severely curtailed by the legislation of 
William the III’s and Anne’s reigns.144 The Whigs had ensured that the new monarchy had no 
power to raise an army, impose new taxation, appoint Parliamentary ministers that wielded any 
specific power or even leave the country without Parliament’s express permission. On several 
occasions during the seventeenth century, the monarch had attempted to involve his English 
subjects into European hostilities but found himself restrained by Parliament’s fiscal 
conservatism and parsimony of the House of Commons.145 This stripping of monarchical power 
allowed for Whig Secretaries of State to wield more power when it came to negotiating peace 
settlements favorable to their causes and using the power of the Royal Navy to push for their 
interests.  
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Further empowering the Whigs was George I’s reclusiveness.146 George often resorted to 
hiding from the public view and avoided public events and speeches mainly because he was 
unable to speak English. For example, when George I initially arrived in England in 1714, one of 
his Hanoverian ministers or secretaries drew up a paper of proposals in which it was carefully 
explained how the king could arrive late enough at The Hague to avoid “much embarrassment 
and a great crowd of people.” However, these people he spoke of avoiding were now his people. 
When George I returned from a trip to Hanover, his ministers had been informed that he wished 
'that there be little concourse of noisy attendants at his landing or on the road to London as 
possible, and he sought to land at Margate or Gravesend to ensure that he could completely 
bypass London if he was able to.147 Since the King held court infrequently, or rarely ventured out 
to meet with ministers, his power was weakened in the eyes of many in the government.  
George’s lack of presence empowered cunning ministers and George’s son, The Prince of 
Wales, to exert more significant influence on the government. The Prince was thoroughly 
insulted and angered when his father had left for Hanover in 1716, as the King left him as the 
regent, albeit, with circumscribed powers.148 King George did not fully trust his son, and he 
made this distrust clear by giving the Prince of Wales the least amount of power needed to rule 
with. Because of this slight, the Prince moved towards a position of greater political 
independence. The Prince soon was welcoming men of all political thoughts and persuasions to 
his court, seeking to exert his influence within the government. Many of the men he embraced 
had fallen out of favor with the King or his ministers and were looking to regain some of their 
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past influence by courting the Prince. Tories and disgruntled Whigs flocked to Hampton Court to 
be welcomed graciously by the prince and princess. The Princess’s company, Walpole predicted, 
would be “two to one of the King’s enemies by end of the summer.” He was sure that the Prince 
was preparing to keep up an interest in parliament independent of the King’s. Furthermore, in 
August Walpole reported to Hanover that the prince had been canvassing support against the 
next session among Tories and discontented Whigs.149   
Even though the Whigs had regained power with King George I, they soon found 
themselves at political odds with each other inside their party. The friction started between the 
Whigs over the issue of the prince’s executive role in his father’s absence. During this time a 
litany of officials lost their posts or left them due to unhappiness with the positions offered them. 
This unhappiness and loss of powerful and experienced men caused issues within the Whig 
party. This dissatisfaction created competing factions that arose after the Hanoverian succession. 
The major defection was when Walpole and Townsend resigned, leaving Sunderland and 
Stanhope in control of the ministry. This event is known historically as the Whig Schism.150 This 
schism eventually led to Walpole trying to align with the Tories to regain power and influence. 
The differing ideology and quest for power, however, ended this alliance quickly, leaving 
Walpole to try and curry favor among the Whigs to return to power. Eventually, the Prince and 
the King reconciled, and with the deaths of Stanhope and Sunderland, Walpole and Townshend 
returned to power and consolidated their position with the Whigs.151  
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Robert Walpole’s accomplishments cannot be downplayed in the study of British 
governance. In fact, he is one of the most important figures in the history of the British Empire. 
Once firmly back in power, Walpole became the First Lord of the Treasury, and more 
importantly, the Chief Minister of George I. Aside from being a talented statesman, Walpole, 
who was highly engaged in pamphlet writing, often sought to sway public opinion through his 
writings.  
The War of the Quadruple Alliance 
 The War of the Quadruple Alliance is historically viewed as to not to be over West Indies 
territory or matters. However, trade disputes and want of access to the West Indies markets had 
indeed again fueled the flames of war. 152 However, trade disputes and want of access to the 
West Indies markets had indeed again fueled the flames of war. Minster Alberoni was trying to 
bring an end to the illegal trade that both the English and French were engaged in throughout the 
Spanish Empire, and at the same time carry out the wishes and desires of his patrons. France had 
virtually gained control over the Peruvian trading markets, bypassing direct trading restrictions 
imposed by Spain by marrying Spanish women and having children with them. Furthermore, 
English smuggling was more rampant than ever in the West Indies. Alberoni had started to 
restrict French and Dutch trade in the Spanish Cadiz trading houses and instead granted England 
greater access in an attempt to keep the British merchants pleased and out of the brewing conflict 
between Spain and Italy. However, Alberoni soon found out about the Anglo-Austrian alliance 
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that was forming and started to restrict British access to Spanish ports and trading markets that 
were supposed to be open to them under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht.  
British Foreign Minister Craggs detailed four major grievances that needed to be 
addressed by Spain if it wished for Britain to stay out of the brewing conflict. These grievances 
all of course centered around trade, not on Spanish intentions on Italy. Craggs charged that 
Madrid had violated agreements on tariff prices for British goods, Spain was restricting 
permitted trade goods into their ports, the South Seas company was not allowed its annual 
trading ship loaded with British trade goods to the West Indies, and it was forcefully embargoing 
British vessels in Spanish ports. Craggs made it clear to the Spanish ambassador that the British 
were entitled to fair and open access to Spain, fair and reduced tariff fees, access the West Indies 
under the terms of the Asiento, and that Britain was not going to give up any concessions to their 
rights to trade with Spain.153 Spain refused to back down from their actions and imposed greater 
restrictions, thus continuing to violate the terms of the commercial aspects of Treaty of Utrecht 
with Britain, France, and the Dutch who were granted special trading privileges by the 
agreement.  
 Trade in Spanish Europe was not the only trade dispute occurring. In the West Indies, the 
Spanish were complaining, with actual grievances, about the irregularities with British shipments 
of goods. Often the five-hundred tons of products the British were allowed to legally ship into 
Spanish held territories once a year was frequently over by hundreds of additional tonnages. The 
South Seas Company accomplished this by docking the allowed trade ship in harbor, having it 
inspected, and then smaller ships would ferry goods to the larger ship, so it appeared that the 
vessel was still only carrying the allotted amount that it came into port with. The South Seas 
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slave ships were also smuggling in more significant amounts of tonnages of goods not allowed 
under the Asiento or Treaty of Utrecht. These actions, when discovered, inflamed and angered 
the Spanish government who was attempting to reform their trading centers and ports in an 
attempt to end rampant corruption.   
Soon Alberoni found that he had overplayed his position between all the nations that 
made up the Quadruple Alliance, and now had to hope that powerful pro-Spanish factions in the 
court of Versailles and the merchant interests in London would prevent either nation from 
stopping Spanish Ambitions in reclaiming lost territory from the War of Spanish Succession.154 
Initially, it seemed that some merchant’s concerns might have prevented Britain from entering 
the war with Spain, however some of the community such as  Hugh Thomas argued that not 
going into war would create a ruinous financial crisis and declared that, “if the King of Spain 
seizes our merchants’ effects and proclaims war against us, our South Seas Company is undone 
and all our Trade ruined. This will cause such a run on the Bank, South Sea, East India Company 
and Exchequers as must infallibly ruin the kingdom.”155 There were members of the British 
Parliament opposed to war because they had significant financial stakes in trade and thought that 
war would hurt them in their pocketbook. They were more “inclined to believe that the 
grievances complained by our merchants might have been redressed in an amicable manner”156 
instead of looking to resort to a costly and long war. In response, it was pointed out by Col. 
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Stanhope that as the envoy to Spain he had, “presented at least five and twenty Memorials to that 
court (Spain), in relation to the complaints of our merchants, without any success hereupon.”157  
The powerful South Seas Company also pushed for war to protect its trading interest. In 
September of 1718, on the advice of the Stanhope-Sunderland ministry, the company submitted 
to the king a representation accusing the King of Spain of breaching the treaties concerning the 
Asiento trade. To ensure that the Company’s grievances were heard, their pleas were published 
in the Daily Courant, a ministerial newspaper.158 It was made clear during the debates in the 
British Parliament during 17 of December 1718 that protecting the overall integrity of the trading 
agreements agreed to in Utrecht were more important to Britain. Hugh Boscawen 1st Viscount 
Falmouth, on behalf of King George, addressed the MPs and issued the declaration of war based 
off of the need to “redress the many injuries done to the subjects of Great Britain by the King of 
Spain, to the unspeakable detriment of the trade of these kingdoms.”159 To which George II 
Treby, Secretary of War moved that, “This House will, with the greatest cheerfulness and with 
the upmost vigour, assist and support his majesty in the war with the King of Spain, until Spain 
is reduced to accept of reasonable terms of peace and to agree to such conditions of trade and 
commerce, as this nation is justly entitled to by their several treaties.”160  
Both France and Britain citing trade violations of the Treaty of Utrecht and King Philip’s 
invasion of Sardinia, committed the Quadruple Alliance to war in 1718 to stop Spanish 
aggression. The British had found out that Alberoni and Cardinal Cienfuegos sought the 
humiliation of England. The two Cardinals were found to be working with Jacobian conspirators 
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with the goal of ruining the house of Hanover. This war, they had hoped, would bring about the 
restoration of the Stuarts, the spoliation of France, and the re-establishment of Catholic 
supremacy in Europe.161 Thus, Britain could not idly stand by while Spain sought the overthrow 
of its monarch. However, the war also managed to create a financial crisis for the South Seas 
Company, as its legal trading of goods and slaves was halted until 1722 and was one of the 
factors that triggered the infamous South Seas bubble.162 
Since the end of the War of Spanish Succession, the West Indies had enjoyed relative 
peaceful trade in the region. Privateering and piracy had been held in check by the presence of 
the British Navy and the Spanish guarda costa. However, with the outbreak of hostilities in 
Europe once again, the British King ordered reprisals and seizures of Spanish subjects and their 
goods as compensation for British merchant losses. King George justified these actions stating 
that “It would be endless to enumerate the complaints of our subjects relating to the infractions 
of treaties, the breach of ancient and established privileges, and the unwarrantable obstructions 
of their accustomed trade and commerce.163 France and Britain further pointed out that the 
Spanish had instigated the War, thus reprisals were justified and legal.  
Privateering was not just an activity engaged in by the British, but all sides ensured that 
they were waging economic war on their enemies. Even between allies, trade remained a zero-
sum game of fierce competition. Partners in a common collective undertaking were perceived to 
be as trustworthy as outside neutrals or enemies, ‘exploiting every occasion to thwart and ruin 
commerce and navigation.164 Privateering knew no limits in the West Indies, at times British and 
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French merchants found themselves boarded and had their property and products stolen from 
ships, even while the British and French armies were fighting Spain. The belligerents justified 
this by looking for enemy goods on any ship. Contrary to all treaties [...] the ‘slightest indication 
of any merchandises pertaining to a subject of the King of Spain’ was enough to trigger 
avaricious British marines or privateers to search for and to confiscate the said merchandise.165  
Furthermore, the justification of privateering followed the same rationale that had been 
propagated in other wars, that loss of revenue and profits that merchants and the country should 
have made in times of peace should and could be recouped by robbing and pillaging their 
enemies on the high seas.  
Treaty of the Hague, February 1720 
 After a series of quick and humiliating defeats, King Philip exiled his once trusted 
advisor Cardinal Alberoni and sued for peace with the alliance. The Spanish court under the 
direction of Jose de Grimaldo (1660-1733) entered into peace negotiations with the British 
statesman James Stanhope and Sir Benjamin Keene (1697-1757)166 at the Hauge. During this 
time the various diplomats put the balance of power first; individual merchants’ complaints on 
violations of the regulation of trade only came in second place.167 After the Treaty of Utrecht, 
formal diplomacy became the norm between the competing European powers and this was the 
case in the negotiations during the Treaty of the Hague. Instead of addressing the growing 
commercial complaints from merchants on all sides, the diplomats sought to focus on amending 
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the treaty of Utrecht as that had a priority over economic quarrels.168 James Craggs, Secretary of 
State for the Southern Department, declared, “the crisis where negotiations on Italy are in at 
present will further prolong the resolutions we had hoped for since a long time.” Issues over 
Spanish succession were again settled formally with it being declared in Article II of the Treaty 
of the Hague; 
And as it is an integral part of these treaties that We (King Philip) abdicate and renounce Our claims 
to those kingdoms, countries and colonies which now form part of His Imperial Majesty's 
possessions in Italy and in Flanders, or which could be ascribed to Him as a result of the present 
Treaty, and of all the rights, kingdoms and colonies in Italy which in other times were part of the 
Spanish Crown, We, a born student of the arts of peace and of the common wealfare, - and this is 
the strongest of all those impulses which motivate.169 
 
 King Philip and his Queen finally had to accept that the lost Italian territory was not 
within their grasp. They lacked the military and economic power to wage a new war to try and 
expand their influence. Furthermore, their most important ally, France, was now working with 
England to thwart Spanish ambitions. The Spanish Armada, once again rebuilt and expanded 
during the War of Quadruple alliance, was thoroughly ravaged during the war, thus impacting its 
ability to guard and maintain its West Indies holdings and its ability even to protect its 
Mediterranean trade routes. The Spanish found themselves again in debt from an unsuccessful 
war, and it was now more critical than ever to protect their holdings in the West Indies in order 
to pay their debts. With fewer ships to patrol and defend their West Indies holdings, the Spanish 
Navy turned to harsher punishments to try and deter smugglers, often lashing and whipping 
violators, or in extreme cases lopping off ears. Pamphleteers, newspapers, and ambitious 
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Ministers in England would use these harsh punishments to push for War with Spain against a 
Prime Minister who had no desire to enter into conflict.  
 Throughout the periods between 1700-1720, Britain often sought to gain greater trading 
concessions and access to Spanish markets using gunboat diplomacy. The British used their 
victories in a war to achieve access and tariff reductions that the Spanish would have never 
relinquished under traditional diplomatic means. While the British were able to acquire such 
rights as the Asiento, favored nation tariff and duty rates, they were not always allowed to take 
advantage of the agreements that were made with the Spanish government. While the Spanish 
had agreed to these concessions in the treaty negotiations, they were not always willing to follow 
through on the treaty promises. The Spanish saw the terms to peace as a slap in the face, and 
always sought ways out of the agreements, or just failed to adhere to the terms. British traders 
and merchants docking in Spanish ports and thinking that they would go unmolested instead 
would find their ships being searched, delayed from port entry, charged duties and rates on 
exempt items, or simply harassed by the Spanish.  
While violation of the treaty agreements created an open case in which the British and 
French could have renewed war with Spain, the British attempted to temper their responses 
between 1721-1739. Walpole and the British government were in debt, and the prospect of 
continual war was likely to bankrupt the government. The South Seas Bubble had created an 
economic downturn that threatened the British economy. Engaging in war further allowed piracy 
and privateering to raid British trading vessels, costing merchants at home hundreds of thousands 
of pounds in lost revenue, loan payments that could not be covered, and duties that the 
government would be unable to collect taxes on. Therefore, Britain sought to diplomatically spar 
and make alliances that would, in their view, force Spain to adhere to the trading rights and 
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privileges she had afforded to the merchants and traders. However, the Spanish still had hurt 
pride and still sought to regain territory that was lost during the War of Spanish Succession. With 
the ouster of Alberoni, the Spanish turned to a new minister, Jose Patino, who sought stability 
and reform in Spain.  
At the end of the War of the Quadruple Alliance, British politics also saw a sweeping 
change in leadership like that of Spain. Many of the leaders that had been in power since 1710 
had either retired or died, Stanhope and Sunderland were among those who had passed. In place 
of the Stanhope-Sunderland faction arose the Walpole-Townsend ministry, which created a new 
dynamic in foreign relations and administrative management which impacted future diplomatic 
exchanges between the British and Spanish. Walpole and Townsend had worked hand in hand 
for years, but as the ministry progressed the friendship that had formerly existed between 
Townshend and Walpole changed into a feeling of jealous and irritable coldness between the 
two. When two men, each inordinately fond of power, each struggling for supremacy, and each 
desiring to be the exclusive recipient of royal favor, were found occupying the highest positions 
in the Cabinet, it became only a question of time and opportunity for the one to triumph over the 
other.170 The death of King George I and the rise of King George II only further strained the 
relationship of Walpole and Townsend. This power struggle between these two men shaped the 
path of diplomacy and the course of the nation over the next twenty years.  
Between 1712-1720 British merchants sought to exploits loopholes in Anglo-Spanish 
treaties. If the British merchants could not find a loophole, instead they traded directly and 
willfully in violation of treaty terms. Nonetheless, all of this trade was done with the 
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understanding that British merchants were openly and willfully disregarding the Spanish desire 
to keep trade protections in place and to not to open its West Indies markets. The Spanish were 
still stuck in a protectionist attitude that was unbending to British wants and demands. However, 
the Spanish were still unable to provide the manufacture goods and needs of their colonies, thus 
illegal trade was being fueled by these needs, and the British were more than willing to fulfill the 
Spanish colonial requirements. Leading this push was the South Seas Company, acting as almost 
a direct arm of the British government, thus again pushing diplomatic focus from the continent to 
the West Indies.  
Chapter 3 
1721-1729 
 
 From 1721-1729 Spain sought to further limit and deprive Britain of trade in the West 
Indies. To accomplish this goal, it was proposed that a new trading company formed by Austria 
would have greater access to Spanish trade with equal if not greater access than that of the 
British. This would allow for the manufactured goods to reach Spanish America under a legal 
trading company that benefited Spain and her allies. This came about as Alberoni’s attempts at 
reforming and reasserting control over Spanish transatlantic trade had failed just as much as his 
attempts at military conquests in Europe. British, Dutch, and French smugglers still operated 
freely within the West Indies and often openly traded in Spanish ports with little consequences. 
Alberoni was unable to stamp out the high levels of corruption that plagued the colonial 
bureaucracies and ports, and the contraband trade only grew, while those communities receiving 
the illicit goods grew more dependent upon them. Most of those people working in the trading 
houses and running stores and businesses depended upon the underground trading markets to 
keep their shelves stocked and their lifestyles maintained by the profits and bribes; therefore, 
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they were unwilling to turn in smugglers. The Spanish still regarded commerce in the Spanish 
Atlantic as a closed metropolitan monopoly, and they sought to shut out all foreign intruders, 
while the British viewed Spain’s resistance to allowing them access as an unfair restriction to 
free trade.171  
Jose del Patino (1666-1736)172, the new minister advising the King and Queen of Spain, 
saw the Treaty of Utrecht as the principal impediment to any serious reform of Spain’s 
transatlantic trading system.173 Patino was correct in his assessment, as it was no secret in British 
circles that the Asiento was used as more of a cover to allow illicit smuggling and trading in the 
Spanish Indies than it ever was to be used for the selling of slaves. Robert Walpole, with his 
new-found power as the First Lord of the Treasury, was concerned with seeking to maintain 
peace on the European continent, and thus was not looking to engage in wars of adventurism. In 
fact, Walpole was often chastising those engage in illicit trade to stop as it hampered Anglo-
Spanish relations. However, even Walpole understood the powerful forces that ran commercial 
interests in Britain, including the role of the South Seas Company and their lust for greater trade 
access. Thus, when faced with the prospect of Austria gaining enhanced trading access to the 
West Indies, Walpole caved to the powerful economic forces and fought to deny Austrian access 
through military intervention.  
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The Treaty of Vienna 
 After the successive military failures, Spain now found themselves with few allies. 
France was supporting the British and the idea of maintaining a European homogeny, and both of 
them were positioning themselves to extract more trading concessions from Spain. Spain, in an 
effort to boast herself militarily and economically, sought a new alliance with an old enemy. The 
Treaty of Vienna between Emperor Charles VI (1685-1740) and Philip V of Spain put an to end 
the legal quarrel that had been dividing them for twenty-five years.174 Under the treaty, Charles 
VI abandoned his claims to Spain, whereas Philip V relinquished his pretensions to the Austrian 
territories in Italy. Relations of enmity transformed into a full-fledged defensive and offensive 
alliance, oiled by Spanish subsidies.175 However, it again put the issue of access to Spanish trade, 
and put Britain’s favored nation trade status, in jeopardy. The Spanish signed a new commercial 
treaty with the Emperor that put the Imperial Trading Company at Ostend on a footing that was 
superior to both Great Britain and Holland.176 In return for this trade access, the Emperor offered 
up diplomatic and military assistance to Spain to help them wrestle control of Gibraltar from 
Britain.  
 The Habsburg Empire had set up the Ostend company in a bid to gain access to the 
worldwide mercantile economy. The British, French, and Dutch were using trade to drive their 
economies, and the Habsburg Empire was deeply in debt after fighting a series of wars in her 
east. Therefore, the alliance with Spain made sense, for it positioned the Habsburgs to enter the 
trading sphere, and take away market share from Britain and France, thus potentially weakening 
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both those nations economically while strengthening Spanish and Habsburgs’ position in Europe. 
The British were so opposed to this alliance and granting of trading concessions that the usually 
diplomatic Walpole, the then Prime Minister of England, was even prepared to declare war 
against the Ostend Company, which according to him posed a significant challenge to the 
English in the field of Commerce.177 
With this new powerful backing, the emboldened Queen Elizabeth of Spain told Colonel 
Stanhope in a meeting to “Choose between the loss of Gibraltar or your trade with the Indies.178 
The British, being war-weary and facing military threats from the north, were willing to 
negotiate the return of Gibraltar, but only if Spain was willing in return to give the British an 
equivalent for the restoration of the fortress---and that would also have to be approved by 
Parliament. The British felt that seceding Gibraltar for Florida, or the eastern part of St. 
Domingo, and for certain commercial advantages would be a fair trade.179 However, Spain was 
not willing to offer anything in exchange as they felt the fort rightfully belonged to Spain and 
should be returned accordingly. The Queen told Stanhope to relay the Spanish demands to the 
British Government, which he did.  
 After communicating the Queen’s message to Townsend, the Minister issued a reply to 
the Spanish demands that was firm and resolute: 
 “The king thinks it not consistent either with his or the nation's honour, after the treatment both his 
majesty and his people have received from the court of Spain, to lay his Catholick majesty's demand 
of the restitution of that place before the parliament ; the late behaviour of Spain towards him and 
his kingdom having set him at liberty from any engagement his majesty might have been under of 
doing it ". 
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 Britain now sensed that without sufficient military backing that Gibraltar was indeed in 
jeopardy to this new alliance. Britain sought to strengthen its alliance with France and shore up 
Germanic support to counter the Austria-Spanish push to exert greater power and influence on 
the European continent.  
Alliance of Hanover 
 
 Britain and France were by no means friends or allies in the traditional sense. Instead, 
they were allies in promoting and maintaining a balance of European order. The Treaty of 
Utrecht did not amount to a mere territorial consolidation against an aggressive would-be 
hegemony, but had instead installed a system whereby France and Britain jointly managed to 
uphold a horizontal and stable international order.180  
 The Austrian-Spanish alliance was now challenging Franco-British interests in terms of 
trade, commerce, military alliances, and another potential succession crisis. The Spanish sought 
to have their Prince Carlos marry the Archduchess Maria Theresa, thus merging the powerful 
nations. If the proposed dynastic merger took place, Britain and France would face an Austro-
Spanish bloc stretching from Flanders on the English Channel to the heel of the Italian boot, and 
from Silesia to the Pyrenees and the walls of Gibraltar.181  
The new Spanish alliance further put the most important national interest of Britain in 
jeopardy, that of maritime dominance. Horatio Walpole (1678-1757)182, Robert Walpole’s 
younger brother, noted that Spanish fleets had often challenged English supremacy upon the 
seas; and trade with Spain on both sides of the Atlantic had long held a leading place among 
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British commercial interests.183 The thought of Spain giving Vienna access to Spain’s overseas 
commercial markets, with trading concessions more significant and favorable than that of Britain 
or any other ally, was to great a threat to British interest. Thus, on September 3, 1725, 
Townshend, the British Secretary of State, on behalf of his government, signed the alliance of 
Hanover with France and Prussia and stated one of the preeminent goals of the alliance was to 
seek the "destruction of the Ostend Company.”184 Further, both France and Britain stayed 
committed to protecting the territorial balance in Europe as previously agreed to under the terms 
of Utrecht. 
 Therefore, the Second article in the Treaty of Hanover affirmed the British and French 
goals to maintain their mutual goals. Yet again, protecting commercial interests was high on the 
list of objectives: 
As the true aim and intention of this alliance between the said kings is mutually to preserve the 
peace and tranquility of their respective kingdoms; their above said majesties do promise to each 
other their reciprocal guarantee for the protecting and maintaining generally all the dominions, 
countries, and towns both in and out of Europe, whereof each of the allies shall be actually in 
possession at the time of the signing of this alliance; as also all the rights, immunities, and 
advantages, particularly those relating to trade, which the laid allies enjoy or ought to enjoy 
respectively.185  
 
 While the Treaty of Hanover had been positioned as keeping European power in check 
and balanced, Britain benefited more under the agreement than her allies. That is because the 
treaty was drawn up purely in favor of English interests. There was opposition in Britain to the 
treaty as they argued that England was to be sacrificed for the promotion of strictly Hanoverian 
interests. "It is a treaty," said the first Pitt, " the tendency of which is discovered in the name." " 
Thus Hanover," writes Chesterfield, " rides triumphant on the shoulders of England."186  
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However, those who opposed it at home were unaware of the secret articles. The Treaty of 
Hanover was entered into to prevent the Pretender ascending the throne, to prevent Gibraltar and 
Minorca from falling into the hands of Spain, and to prevent hurt being done to English 
commercial interests by the maintenance of the Ostend Company.187  
Townshend, who then guided English foreign policy, had suspected that the Austro-
Spanish alliance involved not only the Ostend attack on British trading monopolies, but offensive 
co-operation to recover Gibraltar and restore the Stuarts. With these accusations, Townshend 
whipped public opinion into a panic. By 285 votes to 107, the Commons voted that the treaty of 
Vienna was calculated for the entire destruction of the British trade,188 and thus the Alliance of 
Hanover was the only way to counter these threats. King George, in his support for the alliance, 
noted that the alliance was needed to curb the Austro-Spanish attempt “to threaten my subjects 
with the loss of several of the most advantageous branches of their trade.”189 Walpole, whether it 
was because he had taken only a secondary part in its transaction, and was therefore jealous of 
Townshend, or because he entertained real and sound objections, had not wholly approved of the 
Treaty of Hanover. But though he objected to certain clauses in the treaty, he felt bound to give it 
his unqualified support when he was informed of the nature of the secret articles, and that an 
invasion in favour of the Pretender was seriously meditated. He introduced the matter in the 
House of Commons, and the treaty was approved by a large majority.190 
 Under the Alliance of Hanover, the unity of England and her allies was far more 
formidable than the emperor's loosely knit coalition. When Spain finally decided to lay siege in 
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an effort to secure Gibraltar, Spain quickly found that her allies were less than willing to come to 
a vigorous aid to her and her ambitions for the fort. On the other hand, public opinion still ran 
high in England, a crusade against commercial competition being the only essay in offensive 
foreign politics which appealed to her sordid imagination.191 Thus, by demonizing the Ostend 
company, British MPs and pamphlet writers created an enemy that was perceived as threatening 
the British public, the British economy, and Britain’s allies.  
The Push Towards War 
 
 The public drumbeat towards war with Spain started in 1724. Leading the charge was 
Charles Forman. Forman penned Mr. Forman's letter to the Right Honourable William Pulteney, 
Esq. : shewing how pernicious the Imperial Company of Commerce and Navigation, lately 
established in the Austrian Netherlands, is likely to prove to Great Britain as well as to Holland 
in an effort to discredit the Whig’s more pacifist policy. In this letter, Forman argued that the 
Ostend Company, “portends much mischief to the Trade of Great Britain.”192 In his writings, 
Forman “humbly beg leave to lay before you some of those Dangers with which it immediately 
threatens the Trade of Great Britain.”193 Forman makes the case that the balance of power was 
about to be shifted through trade, territory, and seafaring vessels. The letter fulfilled its purpose 
and riled up public opinion against the Ostend Company and the new alliance. Furthermore, it 
put pressure on the Walpole-Townsend government to act on this new supposed threat to British 
maritime and commercial supremacy.  
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 Throughout 1725 and 1726, the threat of the Austrian-Spanish alliance was further 
emphasized by pamphleteers and the various politically allied newspapers in Britain. In 1727, in 
a letter The Tallies of War and Peace, Or, What May Be Expected from the Present Situation of 
Affairs in Europe, the author argues that if Spain and their allies seek to inhibit British trade and 
force a pretender to the throne that: 
If, contrary to Treaties, any Nation or Nations are refolv’d to interfere with our Trade, deprive us of 
our Possessions, or offer to force upon us a Pretender, we must have War, and give them their fill 
of it, since the Warning given them already for their own Good seems to prove ineffectual.194 
 
The famous writer and man who had significant commercial interests that could have 
been interrupted by the new Spanish alliance, Daniel Defoe, argued for war in his pamphlet 
Advantages to Great Britain and its Allies from the Approaching War. Defoe first railed against 
the government’s actions up to this point declaring that:  
The Conduct of the Hanover Allies has been Passivist, Healing, and visibly endeavoring to, heal 
and make up the breaches which have apper’d, and to preserve a good understanding between the 
powers of Europe: On the other hand, the Conduct of the Enemy has been menacing, provoking, 
and insulting… In a Word, they have breathed War on every Occasion, that if possible, they might 
make it necessary to the Allies to begin it.195 
 
Next, Defoe argued that while going to war to protect British trading interests was 
important, that this war could be become a profitable venture for the nation. And that the War could 
pay for itself through the seizure of Spanish treasure ships. In his tract he argues: 
The Triumph of their Enemies over them, shou'd the Money fall into the Hands of the Hanover 
Allies, would be infinitely a greater Mortification to Spain, as well to their Pride as their Power, 
than the Loss of the Money; for this wou'd be enabling the said Allies to carry on a War against 
Spain at the Spaniards Expense: and this I make no questions they shall do, though they shou'd not 
take the Treasure at Sea at all. But of that by itself.196 
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Finally, Defoe made his case in terms of trade. In his other writings he presented that case 
that if Spain started a war, the belligerent countries would be freed from the obligations of the 
former treaties regulating the trade with the Spanish colonies.197 This breach of the agreement 
would allow for Britain to carry out trade in Spanish America and not be in violation of the old 
order and treaties.  
 While the call for War was gaining momentum, other citizens and Ministers were 
fighting against it. Unconvinced of the arguments of men such as Defoe, they feared further 
increasing sovereign debt. With debt came an increase in taxation. Those most impacted by 
increases in taxes, as earlier pointed out, were those of the gentry class who maintained vast 
property and estate holdings. Further, some merchants had been impacted by the loss of trade 
access during hostilities or they had their ships seized by pirates or the Spanish government. 
With each renewal of hostilities, the merchants, traders, and businessmen worried that if the 
allies did not gain success over Spain, that they could lose access to the footholds they had 
already established in the West Indies during peace negotiations. However, even with these fears, 
the push to war continued.  
 Meanwhile, in Spain, Jose del Patino’s government was trying to balance the desires of 
Queen Elizabeth, as she wanted to both regain control over former Italian holdings, and her need 
to stop rampant contraband trade in the Spanish West Indies trading markets. The South Sea 
Company’s agents were often less interested in selling slaves and instead were running lucrative 
contraband markets, which allowed them to make immense profits without paying duties, taxes, 
or providing their investors a return on their investments. The South Sea Company had managed 
to disrupt all attempts by both sides to try and maintain a legal and fair-trading apparatus that 
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would have helped both nations and potentially soothed diplomatic relationships between the two 
countries.   
 Jose del Patino had insisted on favoring a policy of friendship with the British, while at 
the same time he continued to actively peruse the naval and military reconstruction of Spain’s 
power, to counter that of the British hold on maritime power.198 Furthermore, the Emperor 
sought to rebuild the ties between France and Spain to bolster a position of pacification. The 
Austrian Emperor was in no way attempting to wage war with France, Britain, or any other 
member of the Alliance.  
 Throughout all the attempts at peace and restoration between these nations, the Queen of 
Spain was still fixated upon one goal, obtaining a royal inheritance in Italy for her children, even 
if it meant Spain would come under undue stress and war from foreign powers. Trade concerns 
hardly played a role in her thoughts on diplomacy, or even on governance. This single-
mindedness frustrated attempts at peace as diplomats who did not fall in line with the Queen’s 
objectives were either dismissed or relegated to lower, less influential posts. In Spain itself, the 
Queen’s singular purpose was now well understood and resented. The Austrian connection was 
extremely unpopular, especially amongst the nobles; and even the King's ministers were divided. 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs for Spain Juan Bautista Orendain (the Marquis de la Paz) was in 
favor of it, while Grimaldo, Bermudez the King's confessor, Patino, and others, were wanting 
and seeking an alliance with England and France. The scale was turned by the Queen's new 
favorite, the Austrian ambassador Marshal Konigsegg, who became, all but in name, prime 
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minister of Spain. All those who had opposed the Austrian alliance were sent about their 
business.199 
With these changes, diplomacy fell apart. The Spanish treated Stanhope the English 
ambassador with studied insult, and Cardinal Fleury's attempts to restore good relations between 
England and France were frustrated.200 The British, fearing that war was indeed inevitable, had 
preemptively sent their fleets to the Mediterranean, and more importantly to the Gulf of Mexico, 
and started to patrol and prepare to blockade Spanish ports in the West Indies. This move 
incensed the Spanish. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Juan Bautista Orendain, on November of 
1726, demanded that the British should remove their fleet from America. Stanhope replied in a 
letter to the Spanish court with the following: 
(The Spanish depredations) induced his Britannick Majesty to equip the " several Fleets he had then 
put to Sea,” were (caused by) the notorious Infractions which the Spanish Guarda Costas " have for 
a long Time made with regard to the Commerce and Navigation of his Majesty's Subjects " in the 
West-Indies; Infractions which have been openly complained of, without the least Assurance " of 
Satisfaction or Reparation." And in a letter presented to the Marquis de la Pas, " thought fit to put 
an End to the Depredations and open Hostilities, which have been for some Time " almost daily 
committed in the West-Indies by the " Spaniards, or to give the King the least Satisfaction " for the 
Damages done to his Subjects, in Violation " of all Treaties. Damages so many and so great, " that 
this Treatment from his Catholick Majesty would " have sufficiently justified the King's taking the 
most " vigorous Measures for Redress."201 
 
When the British failed to comply with the demand to remove the fleet, in December of 
1726 Orendain presented Stanhope with a letter that was equivalent to a deceleration of war.202  
Anglo-Spanish War- 1727-1729 
 To call it a war may be an overstatement. The conflict mainly consisted of the British 
navy attempting to blockade Porto Bello in Panama. The British had hoped to disrupt the Spanish 
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silver shipments from the region, but instead, disease killed thousands of British sailors and 
soldiers, and the silver shipments managed to slip through and reach Spain. The Spanish, for 
their part, attempted to besiege and retake Gibraltar. From February 11, 1727 to the 12th of June 
1727 they laid siege but made no headway. The British expertly used their sea power to supply 
the fort; thus the siege failed.  
 The British and French, fearing the Austrian alliance with Spain, had negotiated a secret 
diplomatic agreement between them and Austria that kept the Emperor out of the conflict. Thus, 
the Anglo-Spanish War was posed to end quickly as the Spanish soon found they lacked the 
backing of their powerful counterparts. Although the war did not formally see a truce until 1728, 
no more aggressive acts were taken by either nation after June of 1727.  
The Death of George I 
Near the end of the Anglo-Spanish War, King George the I, on a trip to Hanover, grew ill 
and died. The news of George I's death reached Walpole at Chelsea, in a dispatch from 
Townshend on June 14, 1727. Walpole's favor with the prince had declined in proportion as it 
had risen with the king. He, therefore, could have felt no surprise at the coldness of his reception 
by the new king, who would give him no further instructions than to take directions from Sir 
Spencer Compton, the treasurer of his household, speaker of the house of commons, and 
paymaster to the army.203 There was a general belief that the current administration would be 
completely changed. It was well known that Sir Robert Walpole had irretrievably offended the 
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soon to be King George the II. The Prince had been frequently said when he came to the throne, 
that (Walpole) should never be employed.204 
 With the death of the King, new fears over royal succession and Jacobin plots presented 
themselves. Townshend, writing to Newcastle in 1725, thought that the buildup to the war was a 
faint so that the “Spaniards (could begin) their attack, upon us in favour of the pretender.”205 
With his friends deserting him, the King signaling his replacement was imminent, and even so 
resigned to his fate Walpole said to his friend Sir William Yonge, "I shall certainly go out; but let 
me recommend you not to go into violent opposition, as we must soon come in again."206 He 
managed to survive and keep his post. Walpole’s survival has often been credited to Queen 
Caroline, and his ability to make deals and pay off his adversaries. With the government re-
secured, the Jacobite’s being again thwarted from seizing power, the path to obtaining peace with 
Spain still was of the utmost importance. 
Treaty of Seville 
 
 Signed in November of 1729, the Treaty of Seville signaled the end of hostilities between 
Britain and Spain. Robert Walpole, William Stanhope and Sir Benjamin Keene were all party to 
the negotiations. However, while Sir Benjamin Keene was highly involved in the Treaty of 
Seville, he was deposed at the last minute from being the sole English signatory of the treaty by 
the return of William Stanhope, and he felt some chagrin because all the credit and reward for 
making that treaty went to his senior colleague, whereas he himself received no recognition of 
his services.207 This, evidently, did not impact Sir Benjamin Keene’s overall desire to stay deeply 
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involved as the British representative to Spain, as he continued his service in this fashion for 
many years after. While it may appear that Stanhope had stepped in at the last moment to take 
credit, it should be recognized that Stanhope had a larger share in actually framing the treaty of 
Seville because much of the negotiated terms was done in Paris. But Keene, by his relations with 
Patino who signed for Spain with de la Paz, did far more to make certain of the consent of 
Spain.208 Therefore, both men deserve credit for the final negotiated settlement, as both had 
played important parts in ensuring of its success.  
The primary function of the treaty, aside from peace, was to reestablish the conditions in 
the empires first laid out in the 1667 and 1713 treaties. The Emperor's principal objective during 
the negotiations for peace was to secure the succession of his daughter Maria Theresa.  For this, 
the Emperor was willing to sacrifice the Ostend Company of the Indies.209 Britain agreed, and in 
return the charter for the Ostend Company was revoked, and it became no more a menace to the 
British trading supremacy. With this potential adversary subdued and peace with Austria 
secured, Britain sought to now resolve its issues with Spain. Britain was still unwilling to budge 
on the subject of Gibraltar unless Spain again was willing to offer something economically 
considerable in return, which Spain was still not ready to capitulate to.  However, Elizabeth 
Farnese desired to establish her son in the Italian duchies and to revenge herself upon the 
Emperor for cheating her twice in the matter of the marriage of his daughter with the Infante 
Charles. To compass this object, she practically gave to England all it demanded aside from a 
deal for Gibraltar.210  
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The Asiento was readopted and placed on the same footing as earlier agreed to.211 
Walpole sought, and gained the return of seized British merchant vessels and goods that had 
been taken as spoils of war to alleviate the demands of compensation from the merchant class. In 
Article II of the separate articles, it states that “all ships, merchandize and effects, which shall 
not have been taken or seized on account of unlawful commerce, and which shall now be proved 
authentick proofs and documents to have been detained, seized or confiscated… shall be 
immediately restored.”212 
Walpole, above all else, was committed to the peaceful co-existence between the two 
states. He was a man who was not militarily aggressive and often sought a diplomatic solution 
over that of force. Thus, when there were some in Britain who fought against peace, Walpole 
published his views on why he was happy for peace and tranquility in a pamphlet named 
Observations Upon the Treaty Between the Crowns of Great Britain, France, and Spain 
Concluded at Seville. He laments that “I am not the least bit surprised at the pains some people 
have taken to discredit the Treaty with Spain even before they have seen it,” but he then follows 
with happiness in that, “I cannot help rejoicing at their (those opposed to peace) disappointment, 
which has at once destroyed all the pleasing prospects of power and revenge which they had had 
for some time flattered themselves with.213   
Some of the powerful men fighting against peace, or more so the ineffective nature of the 
treaty with Spain, were those in the South Seas Company. A pamphleteer wrote about the 
ineffectiveness of the agreement stating that, (Walpole) knew that the Publick was daily a 
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Witness to the loud Complaints, made by these Persons, of the Seizures, Detentions, and 
Depredations which our Merchants suffered, without being defended, or having the Means of 
doing themselves Justice put into their Hands.214 The merchants felt that they were being 
unjustly penalized by the Spanish over minor infractions, and that the government was doing 
nothing in return to support their pleas.  
Although they lamented of their treatment at the hands of the Spanish, the British and the 
South Seas Company were still engaged in profitable smuggling ventures, even to the 
exasperation of Walpole and legitimate merchants in the West Indies who were seeking to stop 
the practice. With smuggling and contraband trade came the search and seizures of trade ships 
found with even the most minute infraction of negotiated agreements. The Board of Trade 
lamented before the king and Parliament that the Spanish were also changing the terms of 
negotiated peace after the ratifications of a public and solemn treaty. Furthermore, Spain was 
doing it with manifestly intended, not only to debar the British subjects of that liberty they 
enjoyed before the said treaty was made, but in some measure, to deprive them of the common 
right of all nations.215 The right of course being able to engage in trade in the Spanish West 
Indies. Walpole, listening to the early pleas, fought against the Spanish habit of overzealous 
enforcement of the treaties arguing that it “should never be the case of any ships that traded 
fairly to our own ports, and had not carry’d on any unlawful commerce to the Ports of the 
Spanish West Indies, for no ship that has not been trading can be seized or confiscated for having 
Spanish money onboard.”216  
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After the events of 1721-1729 An Anglo-Spanish peace had again been settled and 
established in a sense, and trade continued, both legal and illegal. However, many festering 
issues were still not addressed that had previously caused bouts of hostility with the two nations. 
A commission between the two nations was established to try to address any future grievances 
between the two powers to prevent future military conflict, yet the commission often proved 
ineffective. Most of the time, during the commission’s annual meetings, were spent on dealing 
with Spanish demands for compensation and on the issue of illegal trade being carried out by 
British merchants. Furthermore, Spain still felt that any additional access to the West Indies 
would only continue to stunt Spanish economic growth. Britain saw that greater access was vital 
to fuel their expansion and wealth, which led powerful financial forces to continue to pressure 
the British government for expanded access, or to continue to turn a blind eye to the rampant 
illegal trading occurring in the region. Neither side were willing to seek a compromise. Thus, the 
failure to settle the disputes by this method resulted in constant bickering between England and 
Spain, especially over the question of the Negro duties and the other problems which grew out of 
it, leading directly to war in 1739.217  
Chapter 4 
 1730-1742 
 
 
By 1730 Britain and her merchants had grown frustrated with their trading relationship 
with Spain. While they had the rights to the Asiento, the trade was not particularly profitable for 
Britain. It suffered from high duties, a poor fiscal policy, impediments from Spanish officials, 
and competition from the illegal trade. Despite the annual privilege, there were only eight British 
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sailings to New Spain under this treaty between 1717 and 1733.218  Under the Asiento 
agreement, the British were to have one commercial ship allowed per year to the trading markets 
in Spain. However, war and political tensions had frequently delayed these from ever sailing or 
allowing to anchor in port, thus depriving the British access to the much sought-after trading 
market into the Spanish West Indies. By the mid-1730s, frustrated South Seas Company 
investors voted to recommend to the crown that it liquidate the Asiento entirely.219 The ever 
increasing and frequent violations of the commercial treaties had continued to strain Anglo-
Spanish relations. Even after the series of small wars between the two powers, and the 
reaffirmation of the commercial treaties and their texts, violations of the terms and restrictions to 
the markets continued. Spain was still focused on protecting its markets in hopes that it could 
continue to be finically beneficial to their country. Britain had shifted their focus from 
continental matters. Instead, Britain was seeking to expand their Empire in terms of territorially, 
and more so, economically. This pushed trade access to the Spanish West Indies to the front of 
British commercial interests, however, Robert Walpole was not wanting to commit militarily to 
expansion, and hoped to keep peace, as that meant retaining power and hopefully commercial 
prosperity. In the end, commercial influence proved to be too great of a force for even Walpole 
to oppose, and a war of trade loomed on the horizon.  
A Shift in British Diplomacy & Continued Grievances 
 
Britain was undergoing yet another shift in political leadership which would change the 
course of how Anglo-Spanish diplomacy would be handled. Townshend had been known to have 
a more adventurous and militaristic view of how to maintain the Anglo-French balance of power 
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in Europe---meaning he relied more upon the threat or actual use of force when it came to 
anything that might disrupt the balance of trade or power. Sir Robert Walpole’s idea of foreign 
policy was easier to characterize than that of almost any other 18th-century minister; in a word, it 
was peace.220 If Europe could be maintained in an environment of peaceful relations, then the 
high costs of war could be averted, debt avoided, trade would happen without harassment and 
become highly profitable for all, and taxes could be lowered. With peace came stability, and with 
stability came political safety and security for Walpole. These differing styles and goals lead to a 
rupture of relations between the two men in 1730. It is noted in Walpole’s memoirs that: 
His resignation (Townsend’s) was owing to a disagreement with his brother-in-law and co-
adjutor, Sir Robert Walpole, which had long subsisted. It had been occasionally compromised 
by the interference of common, friends, but finally broke into a rupture, which rendered the 
continuance of both in office incompatible. The causes of this misunderstanding were various, 
and originated from the difference of temper, from disagreement on subjects of domestic and 
foreign politics, from political and private jealousy. Townshend was frank and impetuous, long 
accustomed to dictate in the cabinet, and fond of recommending bold measures. Walpole was 
mild, insinuating, pliant, and good-tempered; desirous of conciliating by lenient methods, but 
prepared to employ vigor when vigor was necessary. The impetuous manners of Townshend, 
began to alienate the king, and disgust the queen: several members of the cabinet were no less 
dissatisfied with him.221 
With Walpole effectively now the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, the path 
forward in British politics and diplomacy was supposed to be one of peace. Walpole finished 
diplomatic negotiations with both Spain and Austria. Further, Walpole navigated and helped 
Spain and Italy to solve some of their diplomatic issues. However, Walpole’s actions had come 
at a price. While the French maintained friendly relations of sorts with the British, they felt that 
they had been betrayed by Walpole’s double-dealing to secure settlement of the Anglo-Spanish 
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differences.222 Thus, the French slowly were moving away from their long-held British alliance, 
and again sought out Spain as an ally.  
Throughout this political shift, trade and commercial issues again began to come to the 
front of foreign policy. The Spanish Minister Patino, seeking ways to combat smuggling and 
contraband trade, started to enlist and use Spanish corsairs that had been used during the last war 
to augment the Spanish fleet in the West Indies. The unrestrained attacks by the Spanish corsairs, 
like the shady contraband business that it sought to combat, functioned without clear boundaries 
and rules, and illicit and legitimate commerce alike suffered serious losses.223 The Spanish also 
attempted to recruit spies and informants to get a better understanding of the extent of the 
smuggling activities occurring in the West Indies. During the negotiations of the Treaty of 
Seville, the South Seas Company invited John Burnet, an agent of the company, to assist the 
British delegation. Burnet had spent more than ten years as an agent for the company in the West 
Indies, and it was thought he would be a valuable expert to assist in the negotiations. However, 
the Spanish and Burnet had entered into a secret agreement, as Burnet had grown an affinity for 
the Spanish after all his years living and working among them. Burnet provided the Spanish 
government with any information he had on the illicit trade being carried out by the South Seas 
Company and by its employees throughout the Spanish Empire. In general terms, Burnet 
declared that the South Sea Company had long kept the Spanish American colonies flooded with 
English contraband goods through such practices as false measurements and excessive crowding 
of the permission-ships, sending merchandise on the packet-boats that were supposed to carry 
only negro slaves, licensing individuals who traded extensively under cover of supplying slaves 
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to those sections of the Spanish American coast where the company did not have factories.224 His 
information was designed to present an accurate and precise set of complaints that could be used 
against the British to revoke the Asiento and turn it back over to the Spanish government. For 
this information, Burnet was given a pension from the Spanish government and a political 
appointment in the government.225  It was during this time that the full extent of payoffs to high 
ranking Spanish officials and the level of smuggling occurring became known. As damning as 
the information was against the South Seas Company, the British and Spanish again agreed to 
continue on the Asiento based upon the terms negotiated under the Treaty of Utrecht, with 
modifications.  
Now armed with Burnet’s detailed information on the smuggling activities being carried 
out in the West Indies, in 1731, the Spanish military governors of Santa Marta moved to end 
smuggling operations using military officers to subjugate native populations who controlled the 
contraband trade in their jurisdiction. Other governors used a system of military sentinels or 
small squads to patrol and intercept contraband at key locations.226 With increased enforcement 
came increased interactions between British smugglers and Spanish military officials, which 
often led to either imprisonment or in some cases death. The British public was starting to hear 
more and more of these “attacks” on their fellow countrymen, mainly from agents of the South 
Seas Company, and calls to do something to protect British merchants were slowly growing. 
Efforts were again attempted by both countries to solve and settle their trade disagreements, but 
again many of the problems in coming to a resolution of their issues came about because of 
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British smuggling that was still not controlled or even attempted to be reined in by the 
Government or the trading companies. Furthermore, it became apparent that trade negotiations 
from the 1670s were no longer adequate when it came to determine legal and illegal trade goods, 
as British colonies were now producing similar goods as those of the Spanish. The similarity of 
goods and products became an issue when Spanish guarda costas stopped British vessels and 
claimed smuggling, yet could not adequately prove that those products were indeed contraband. 
This constant stopping, searching, and being unable to prove illicit trade inflamed British 
merchants. For an unlucky few, smuggling now came with a death sentence.  
When Viceroy Jose de Armendariz y Peruerena (1670-1740), the Marques de 
Castelfuerte, was assigned to the West Indies to reshape and end smuggling, he did so with 
vigor.227 He issued a royal cedula that stipulated that smugglers if caught, would be put to death. 
The same went for ministers and any Spaniards engaged in the illegal trading system.228 Under 
this new harsher system, the future face and name of the upcoming war met his fate with the 
gurada costa forces that were now acting in an open and hostile manner to anyone they thought 
was a smuggler, and they lopped off one of Captain Jenkin’s ears in the process. In response to 
growing incidents and complaints, the British Navy started to escort legitimate British 
commercial shipping vessels to the region.  
In 1732, the merchants and shareholders of the South Seas Company sought to negotiate 
an end to the unprofitable Asiento agreement. While the Asiento gave cover to smuggling 
operations, it cost vast sums to maintain the legal service it was supposed to provide, with 
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virtually no legitimate profit shown to offset the costs. This lack of profitability was due to 
smuggling operations of the other empires and independent merchants. An enormous number of 
private individuals, interlopers, and adventurers had successfully engaged in smuggling activities 
that had produced an unfair competition in which the South Seas Company could not contend 
with. While the South Seas Company was smuggling goods within their annual ship and slave 
vessels, the volume paled in comparison to that of which the private smugglers were able to 
import. Furthermore, South Seas vessels were often more closely scrutinized by Spanish 
inspectors, limiting their smuggling success at times. Contemporary pamphlets tell us that the 
interlopers sold slaves and goods at a price with which the Company could not compete, that 
New Spain and Cuba derived half their provisions from illicit sources, and the like. The prices of 
the Company were cut, their goods undersold, and even their existence endangered from illegal 
trade.229  
The negotiations between the company and the Spanish were progressing, with the 
Spanish offering out a portion of the future profits to shareholders. However, the British 
government soon intervened and ended the negotiations. The only reason the Asiento was not 
turned back over to the Spanish was due to Walpole and Newcastle opposing the relinquishing of 
it as it had been a key part of the Treaty of Utrecht. Furthermore, during the 1730-1732 meetings 
to try and overcome disputes between the two nations, the account books for the South Seas 
Company were ordered to be inspected and audited to ensure that the King was being paid his 
fair share of any profits the company was generating. The South Seas Company instead 
obstructed and tried to prevent a full accounting of their activities, as it would be found out that 
much of its operations were in violation of treaty agreements. The lack of profit and the 
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continual missing of scheduled promised payments to the King of Spain would ignite more 
hostility between the Spanish and the South Seas Company. By 1735, the constant piracy and 
disagreement over unpaid duties led the Spanish to suspend the importation of Negroes. In early 
1736, with no resolution, the Spanish king suspended all trade between the crown and the South 
Seas Company until duties were paid and the accounts of the annual shipments were provided to 
the Spanish court.230  
The Loss of Patino 
 
 Patino had served in the role of unofficial Prime Minister of Spain for ten years. During 
that time, he proved himself to be a master at war, diplomacy, finance, naval affairs, and 
commerce.231 It has been noted that Patino possessed all the qualities which were required to 
manage a suspicious and hypochondriacal monarch like Philip, and an artful impetuous and 
interested woman like the queen. He was equally master of every branch of policy, clear and 
prompt in the transaction of business, and combined uncommon address, subtilty, and suavity of 
manners, with the firm and persevering spirit of a Spaniard. He had become the most able 
statesman that Spain had seen in an Era.232 But Patino fell ill, lingered on for a month, and on 
November 3, 1736, he died. Throughout his tenure, he had reshaped Spain’s navy and maritime 
trading systems. He established protectionist systems that help to revitalize and grow Spanish 
manufacturing. Furthermore, he was a skilled diplomat and negotiator that Spain desperately 
needed.  
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With his death, Spanish diplomacy and governance would fall into the hands of three 
men, Sebastian de la Quadra (1687-1766), Patino’s handpicked replacement. Mateo Pablo Díaz 
de Lavandero y Martín, the Marques de Torrenueva (1681-1747), and Francisco de Varas y 
Valdes (1700-1752), none of which were nearly as capable as Patino had been. Sir Benjamin 
Keene, the British Ambassador to Spain, noted that “La Quadra will place his utmost merit 
entirely on his resignation to their orders, without prompting them to any party, or making 
himself responsible for the least imaginable accident.”233 Furthermore, historians have noted that, 
unlike Patino, who ruled his sovereigns even while affecting to bend to their wishes, and 
flattering their ambition, La Quadra possessed all the timidity and irresolution of a weak and 
contracted mind, and aspired no higher than to become the mere agent of the king and queen.234 
Assisting Sebastian de la Quadra, was Torrenueva, the Secretary of Marine for the Indies, who 
was noted as being “a more difficult, tenacious, disputable antagonist never was met with.” 
Overall Sir Benjamin Keene felt that “This country (Spain) is at present governed by three or 
four mean stubborn people of little minds and limited understandings.”235 The inability of these 
three men working separately and with differing agendas, often left the new Spanish foreign 
policy confusing and contradictory at times, with one minister presenting an opposing message 
over that of another in British courts.  
The Demand for Retribution Against Spanish Depredations 
 
 Walpole’s attachment to peace at all costs was often counter to a vast majority of the 
leadership of Britain. King George II did not share Walpole’s horror of warfare and was willing 
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to enter into conflict if it meant the safety and security of Hanover. Furthermore, the King could 
not ignore the demands of European power politics and had to be ready to back up his alliances 
and commitments on the continent. Even Walpole’s subordinates did not fully embrace the 
prospect of perpetual peace, as they knew Europe was all too often in a state of turmoil with 
shifting alliances and competing interests between the empires and countries.  
After the elections of 1734, and Walpole again assured of his position, he continued his 
calls for peace and tranquility in Britain.  However, Walpole had made enemies on his way to 
secure his position and power. He was accused of corruption, buying off Ministers, and engaging 
in any action that he felt would help his position. Seeing the plights of the merchants could be 
used against Walpole, oppositional Ministers in Parliament decided to confront Walpole on the 
issue. During one such session, Sir William Wyndham (1688-1740) rebuked Walpole, first 
insinuating that Walpole only had power because, “(Walpole had) corrupt(ed) majority of his 
creatures, whom he retains in daily pay, or engages in his particular interest, by granting them 
those posts and places.”236 Then Wyndham called out Walpole for not protecting the merchant 
class, who were bitterly complaining about how the Spanish guarda coastas were treating them, 
and that he was avoiding war simply to keep power. He stated; “Let us suppose the true interest 
of the nation by such means neglected or misunderstood, her honour and credit lost, her trade 
insulted, her merchants plundered, and her sailors murdered; and all these things overlooked, 
only for fear his (Walpole’s) administration should be endangered.”237 
Sir John Barnard (1685-1764)238 in the House of Commons pontificated; 
                                               
236 Ewald, A. Sir Robert Walpole: A Political Biography. 1676-1745, 252. 
237 Ibid, 253.  
238 John Barnard was the Lord Mayor of London and a Minister of Parliament. During his time in office he often 
pushed for the commercial interests of London and its merchant class. He often sided with those seeking to lower 
95 
 
The abuses complained of by the petitions now before us, are, I must say, Sir, of the most 
extraordinary measure… By these petitions we are told, that the Spaniards have not only seized our 
ships, with their effects in the most arbitrary manner, but that they have inhumanely treated our 
seamen… These insults and abuses have been continued I may saw without interruption… This is 
not the first time our merchants have been obliged to sue this house for redress in this affair.239  
Sir Barnard continued to point out that the British had frequently sought diplomatic 
redress from the Kingdom of Spain, yet some of the British merchant vessels that had been 
detained, either lawfully or unlawfully, by the Spanish for over eight years without resolution. 
Sir Bernard continued to argue that the Spaniards had bamboozled the British public and 
government, and that the Spanish could no longer be trusted to meet their treaty obligations. 
Thus a further, harder approach needed to be taken to protect the British merchants and their 
ships.  
Many of those arguing for a War with Spain, did have an actual case that the Spanish 
were purposefully engaged in hostile activities against the British. It was coming to light that 
King Philip and his successive ministers, had adopted a policy to maintain indirect hostility 
against British trade, under the pretext of search and the rights of sovereignty. They knew that 
their officers and guarda costas frequently made illegal seizures, and committed unjustifiable 
outrages against the crews of British ships. Some of these captured ships and crews had been 
returned, and the offenders punished---though with the tardiness which was inherent in the 
Spanish counsels, and with the reluctance naturally derived from a knowledge of the constant 
and flagrant violation of the commercial regulations established between the two nations.240 
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The push for war was quite open with pamphleteers churning out arguments against 
Spain, and demanding retribution and satisfaction against the guarda costas on behalf of the 
merchants who were being preyed upon. One such writer noted that; 
There is a long and black catalogue of British Ships taken from us by the Spaniards. These heavy 
and sever losses have ruined so many of our traders and plantations. These losses have reduced 
many families to misery… Mr. Stanhope, the Spanish depredations in the West-Indies, say, The 
notorious infractions, which the Spanish Guarda Costas have for a long Time made, with Respect 
to the Commerce and Navigation of his Majesty’s Subjects in the West Indies ; Infractions, which 
have been openly complained of, without the least Assurance of Satisfaction, or Reparation. These 
Things — are sufficient to exhibit the Reasons, which induc'd his Majesty to — equip the several 
Fleets be bath put to Sea.241 
 
In Parliament, the calls for retribution continued with Alderman Willmot confronting 
Walpole and declaring, "Our countrymen in chains! And slaves to Spaniards! Is not this enough 
to fire the coldest? Is not this enough to rouse all the vengeance of national resentment? And 
shall we sit here debating about words and forms, while the sufferings of our countrymen call 
loudly for redress?”242 
However, Walpole at this moment stayed unmoved by their calls. The opposition 
continued their inflammatory rhetoric and on March 3, 1738, presented a petition to Parliament, 
in which a group of merchants, sailors, planters, and other persons claimed to be harmed by the 
continual harassment of the Spanish in the West Indies. They presented harrowing tales of being 
hanged in irons for days, languishing in dirty dungeons, fed rotting food, being forced to perform 
manual labor, and finally tortured and beaten at the hands of their capture. These stories captured 
the imagination of the public and newspapers.  
While citizen tempers flared in Britain, Spain was not immune from the demands of their 
citizens as well. Mobs patrolled through the different Spanish towns clamoring for vengeance 
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against those who had insulted their country by calling her people cowards, spies, and brutes. 
From Cadiz to St. Sebastian, from Madrid to Barcelona, angry murmurs broke out against the 
arrogance of England in presuming to dictate terms to a proud race, whom her frauds and 
piracies had grossly injured.243 
Back in Britain, more witnesses came forward to regale Parliament with their tales of 
woe.  It became understood that the bearers of testimony had been induced by their interests. 
These witnesses and merchants came forward in hopes of obtaining reparation from Spain. They 
often exaggerated their injuries, and the treatment they received at the hands of the Spanish.  
Also, testifying against the Spanish was welcomed and encouraged; the merchants and witnesses 
had been encouraged by the opposition party to embellish their plight as drastically as they 
could. These oppositional leaders were fighting against the administration of Walpole, and in 
doing so, they used these witnesses to try and show that a pacifist policy was only hurting the 
country and British citizens alike. The witnesses were taught to believe, that if they made good 
their allegations, that Walpole who had tamely suffered such oppression would be removed, and 
that his successors would act with such vigor as to force the king of Spain to indemnify them for 
their losses and sufferings.244  Walpole was still willing to try and preserve peace between 
Britain and Spain. In a speech before the House of Commons on March 3rd, 1738, Walpole tried 
to make his case against war once more: 
I shall readily agree, Sir, that our merchants have been often treated most unjustly and more 
inhumanly by the Spanish Guarda Costas, and that both the honour and interest of the nation are 
deeply concerned in obtaining reparations for past injuries… but we certainly ought not to have to 
recourse to arms as long as there is any prospect of obtaining redress in a peaceable manner.245  
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Walpole was fully aware that the British traders abused the indulgence which they 
enjoyed, both by custom and treaties; but he knew that this indulgence, as well as the regular 
commerce, would suffer by war; and he was unwilling to wound the national feelings of the 
Spaniards.246 Walpole was sure that Spain was not ready for a war with Britain, and that he could 
find a diplomatic solution to avoid war. To this end, he was willing to negotiate out peace with 
Spain in Pardo. 
Convention of Pardo 
 
In an attempt to stave off War, Spain and Britain convened the Convention of Pardo in 
1738 to try to peacefully resolve their issues. The stated goals, as laid out in the opening of the 
convention were to: 
Whereas Diﬀerences have arisen, of late Years, 'between the two 'Crowns of Great Britain and 
Spain, on account of the Visiting, Searching; and Taking of Vessels, the Seizing of Eﬀects the 
Regulating of Limits, and other Grievances alleged on each side, as well in the West Indies, as 
elsewhere; which differences are so furious and of such a nature, that if care be not taken to put an 
entire stop to them for the present and to prevent them from the future, they might occasion an open 
rupture between (Britain and Spain).247 
At this time, Spain did not wish for war, especially with England, and agreed by the 
Convention of Pardo (January 1739) to pay an indemnity of £95,000 to the British as the cost of 
loss of trade and goods that had come about because of depredations. The justification for the 
payment was laid out in Article III, in which Spain admitted to holding British goods and ships, 
and that the payment was to be used to pay back those losses to British subjects. In return, Spain 
sought a peaceful arrangement of all open questions by a conference at Madrid, and also pressed 
for the payment by England of specific claims made by her against the South Sea Company.248 
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Furthermore, the Spanish were seeking payment of £68,000 from the South Seas Company in 
back fees from the Asiento contract that was understood to be owed to the Spanish crown. This 
payment would be one of many factors that led to war between the two nations. 
The leaders of each nation and their diplomats diligently sought to try and prevent the 
looming war. During the Convention of Pardo, the ministers engaged in complex negotiations 
over smuggling, depredations, and trading debts, and they nearly succeeded in producing a 
workable commercial settlement.249 However, the Convention of El Pardo failed to address one 
of the biggest British grievances, that of the Spanish right to search British merchant vessels in 
the West Indies to try and find smuggled goods. This right to search continued to be a source of 
friction between the two powers, and those who were seeking to find an excuse for war with 
Spain often latched onto this issue. 
War had become inevitable after the terms and agreements were not ratified by either the 
King of Spain or the Parliament of Britain. Walpole’s overtures at peace had failed, and the war 
factions grew stronger and bolder in Britain. Walpole’s peace faction now laid open to a raucous 
William Pitt (1708-1778).250 Pitt stole the attention for the next few months in Parliament and 
emerged at the head of the anti-Walpole faction. 
On March 8th, 1739 William Pitt took to the floor in Parliament to openly fight against 
the Convention of Pardo. In his speech he railed against the Spanish Right to search stating; 
Sir as to the great nation objection, the searching of (British) ships… is an usurpation, an inhuman 
tyranny claimed and exercised over the American seas. The court of Spain has plainly told you 
(Walpole) that if you shall steer due course and if you shall navigate… near her coasts you shall be 
seized and confiscated! The complaints of your despairing merchants, the Voice of England has 
                                               
249 Young, P. Domestic Politics and the Escalation of Commercial Rivalry, 218. 
250 William Pitt was well known for his deft hand with parliamentary politics and his unparalleled skills with rhetoric 
and language. Pitt eventually rose to become Prime Minister of Britain in 1766.  
100 
 
condemned it: be the guilt of it upon the head of the advisor: God forbid that this committee should 
share guild by approving (The terms of the convention and the right of the Spanish to search).251  
  King George II lost faith in Walpole and his overtures at peace and put his backing 
behind the now growing war faction headed up by Pitt. As the cries grew louder, the King of 
Britain formally declared war on June 15, 1739, which was followed by ratification in Parliament 
on October 23, 1739. The War of Jenkins’ Ear had started, and it would eventually be 
encompassed into the War of Austrian Succession.252  
The South Seas Role in the Causation of the War of Jenkins Ear 
 
From the first to the last the actions of the South Sea Company and its manner of trying 
to advancing its claims hampered the Government, increased irritation, and exercised a malign 
and disastrous influence on negotiations between the two powers.253 
The South Seas Company refusal to pay the debts that the Spanish king felt entitled to 
was a primary driver in the commencement of hostilities between Britain and Spain. If the South 
Seas Company had abided by the terms of the Asiento, and engaged in the legal trade that it was 
entitled to, the conflict could have been averted. However, the South Seas company was 
unrelenting in its desire to pay nothing to the King of Spain. Some of this was based on the fact 
that the Company was near insolvency and could hardly come close to paying the £68,000 they 
owed in back royalties to the King. The King of Spain desperately needed the funds to make 
good on his promise to pay the British crown £95,000 to offset the losses British merchants had 
lost at the hands of the guarda costas.  
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Even the public and pamphleteers of the era knew that the issues between the South Seas 
Company and the King of Spain were not going to be settled through diplomacy with G. Spavan 
noting in his pamphlet  Strenuous motives for an immediate war against Spain: with a short 
account of the vigorous war made by King Edward I for depredations upon his subjects : Mr. 
Addison's opinion of our trade and commerce : the author's thoughts upon the fatal 
consequences of losing the present opportunity that; “The South Sea Company has very large 
Demands upon Spain already and as I am convinced they will never adjusted without a War; they 
must therefore comfort themselves with the hopes of having satisfaction for all their wrongs 
upon our Success."254 
 Justification for the war on behalf of the South Seas Company was defended in the press 
and in the public with one pamphleteer declaring that:  
King of Spain did agree to pay that Sum (95,000) at a Time limited by the Convention; but when 
that Time came, the stipulated Payment was not made, by which means the Convention was 
manifestly violated, and broken by the King of Spain, and the English Subjects do to this Time 
remain without any Satisfaction for the many grievous Losses sustained by them. Which Violation 
of the Convention the King of Spain has been induced to colour by Reasons and Pretenses, which 
when candidly and impartially examined appear to be mere Suppositions, unsupported by Proofs, 
and void of all Foundation. Thus all impartial Men, if they consider and compare the Conduct and 
Behaviors the Court and Subjects of Spain, with that of the Court and Subjects of Great Britain, will 
be convinced, that his Britannick Majesty has entered into a just and necessary War.255 
 
Failures by both parties to adhere to even the most basic treaty obligations and 
agreements continually led to war between the two nations. The war of 1739, known to us as the 
Spanish War or War of Jenkins' Ear, was severe politics. It stood for all that was not dynastic 
self-seeking in the foreign politics of Spain throughout the century. This was not a war waged for 
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territorial claims, or by a Royal family member seeking for a dynastic expansion. The War was 
waged over trade and economics. The King of Spain in his Declaration of War against Britain 
pronounced that,  
“That for the future the Trade and Commerce with all the English Subjects shall be illicit and 
prohibited, and all their Manufactures, Merchandizes and Produce, as likewise whatsoever they 
shall treat, negociate, and transact in these Kingdoms, in such manner as the Prohibition of the 
said Trade is to be understood, as I will and understand it, to be absolutely and really forbidding 
and hindering the Importation of the said Commodities, Produce, Goods, Merchandizes, and 
Manufactures of the said Dominions.256 
 
 The King of Spain went on to list out his grievances, the same as which the traders and 
merchants of Britain had done. The war directly came down to the fact that illegal trade was 
happening in his colonies, which in turn hurt his country’s merchants and industry. To protect his 
nation’s economy, he felt that he had to end the over-reliance of British smuggled goods in the 
West Indies.   
 
Economic Impact of Illicit British/ French/ Dutch Trade on Spanish Merchants 
 
There are questions about how profitable illicit trade was for those who engaged in it, 
since records of illegal activity were rarely recorded or made public. This research sought to how 
profitable legal trade from the region was but ran into difficulties in obtaining full data sets.257 
However, the documented evidence of the economic impact on Spanish merchants is clear. 
Decade over decade, fewer and fewer Spanish merchant vessels and commercial tonnage was 
shipped and purchased in Spanish American territory during the annual trade fairs. The chart 
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below shows a gradual decline, and it should be noted that the decline started after the Spanish 
allowed for free and clear access to the British in the West Indies after the Treaty of Madrid in 
1667-1670. More striking is that over the course of approximately 140 years, the Spanish 
population was increasing in the region, not shrinking, meaning that there should have been a 
higher demand for Spanish products. While some of this loss of demand can be attributed to the 
region’s growing self-sufficiency in regard to crop production and basic necessities, a majority of 
those colonies did not set up and create a manufacturing-based economy, instead opting to grow 
and maintain the hacienda system or engage in precious metal mining. Therefore, the need and 
demand for manufactured goods should have shown an increase in shipping and tonnage needed 
for a growing population and economy. Therefore, the constant loss and impact that smuggling 
had on the Spanish West Indies economy cannot be understated. It is clear why Spain was first 
willing to take desperate measures in the form of depredations against smugglers. Furthermore, 
the case for going to war to preserve its economic prosperity was sound and just looking over the 
amount of lost trade Spain was suffering at the hands Britain smugglers.  
Galeones and Isthmian Fairs 1600-1739258 
Years Fairs Ships Tons 
1600-1609 4 187 70,453 
1610-1619 7 169 66,870 
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1620-1629 8 193 85,166 
1630-1639 9 160 70,096 
1640-1649 6 153 55,685 
1650-1659 7 56 28,070 
1660-1669 4 61 24,800 
1670-1679 5 57 25,300 
1680-1689 2 23 9,000+ 
1690-1699 2 23 8,500+ 
1700-1709 1 15 3,542 
1710-1719 0 0 0 
1720-1729 2 31 5,174 
1730-1739 2 23 5,753 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 The British policy of engaging in war to secure access to Spanish America and more 
importantly the West Indies trade had indeed initially been successful up to 1712. However, from 
1712-1739, the British merchants bitterly complained that they did not have full access to the 
West Indies trade, yet their engagement in illegal contraband trade was highly profitable. This 
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access was only realized after the expertly negotiated terms of the Treaty of Madrid by British 
diplomats granted British vessels free and unfettered access to the West Indies. Then with the 
granting of the Asiento after the War of Spanish Succession, again through expert diplomacy, the 
British merchants now had a valid reason to have trade goods in the region and have Spanish 
coins on their ships. The issues arose over British merchants abusing their access and creating a 
vast network of illegal trade in the region, one so prevalent that it had corrupted much of the 
Spanish governmental workers and created a dependency on British goods in Spanish held 
territories.   
 One of the defining diplomatic issues was the problem of treaties using opaque, complex 
and ambiguous provisions that offered and opened a state to peruse and secure its self-interest 
while failing to fully secure a long term peace. Opacity tends to render accusations of violation 
challenging to sustain and offer what can be deemed as wiggle room when a conflict over the 
provisions of a treaty arise.259 The British often used this “wiggle room” to try and bypass 
restrictions on trading in the Spanish held West Indies. After each successive war, the Spanish 
attempted to clarify language and privileges granted by them to the British, often with little 
success, thus again igniting conflicts over issues of trade. However, frequent changes in the 
Spanish government often prevent Spain from deploying and presenting a consistent policy on 
how to deal with Britain, furthermore, Spanish diplomats often failed to promote Spanish 
economic and trade policy.  The only consistency seemed to be that of keeping the British out of 
the West Indies and trying to retake Gibraltar and Italy. Alberoni was only interested in currying 
favor with the Queen and perusing her ambitions. Patino was more effective as he brought 
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reforms and was a deft politician able to focus on both the royal desires and those of Spain, 
however he passed away before effective reforms could take place. If Spain would have 
recognized that opening trade would allow for then legal British goods to enter into their ports, 
that those goods could be taxed or have duties laid upon them. By adhering to protectionism, 
they lost more than they could have gain through open trade The British, for their part, found 
relative stability in the leadership of their government after 1721. Britain used this edge in 
diplomacy to build diplomatic relationships in the courts of Spain, and the rest of Europe. 
However, Walpole often found that powerful commercial interests often fought against his 
passivity and diplomatic pushes for peace.  
It should be understood that illegal British trade often prevented standard diplomatic 
measures to correct and create a better system of trade. British diplomats were met with hostility 
over their inability to stop their merchants from hurting the tightly controlled trading monopoly 
in the region. The British government turned a blind eye to these activities, and the Spanish tried 
everything in their power to stop them, which escalated the issue. Eventually, in an overly 
aggressive attempt to stop British smuggling, the Spanish instituted a system of searching and 
seizing vessels in the region, which infuriated the British merchants.  
The expansion and overuse of depredations against British sailors forced the otherwise 
peaceful Walpole into a war he never wanted. Walpole tried to sue for peace up to the very end, 
but the voice of the people, the powerful South Seas Company unwillingness to comply with the 
demands of the Spanish crown and the Ministers in Parliament pushed him into war. Peaceful 
diplomacy failed because of British illegal trading in the West Indies, and the only way Britain 
ever saw success in gaining access to Spanish trade in the West Indies in the first place was 
through gunboat diplomacy. However, gunboat diplomacy ultimately failed to expand trading 
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access; instead it often only reaffirmed previously negotiated settlements and terms, as noted in 
virtually every treaty of the era. Lastly, gunboat diplomacy was more harmful to trade when 
implemented, as war opened privateering and seizure of legitimate trade vessels. Pamphleteers 
and ministers often thought the privateering would offset the cost of war, but it never lived up to 
that promise. Instead, the Asiento contract was interrupted, and the South Seas Company was 
restricted from trading legally in the region during open hostilities. War simply fueled the illegal 
traders and contrabandist, and that damaged diplomatic hopes going forward.      
Throughout 1712-1742 British ambitions were focused upon expanding its trading access 
and colonial empire, not wholly upon maintaining continental power balance. As noted, peace 
with France had allowed for Britain to focus upon empire building and expansionism. While 
Britain would intervene in continental matters, such as in the event of a potential Austria-Spanish 
alliance that could have shifted the power balance in Europe, it often did so to secure British 
economic expansion and interests. For this reason, Britain sought to stop the alliance as they 
feared that Spain was open to giving Vienna access to Spain’s overseas commercial markets, 
with trading concessions more significant and favorable than that of Britain.  
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